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A Proposed System of Sanctions to Ensure the Preservation of Human Rights
during Armed Conflict
INTRODUCTION
The recognition that basic human rights are crucial blocks in the
structure of any society is rapidly finding its way into the realm of both
international and municipal law. Certain human rights have long been set out
1
in the United States Constitution. Other documents setting forth human rights
2
concepts, include the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
3
and the European Convention of Human Rights, both of which are concerned with
human rights on an international scale. Newly emerging nations, especially
those which have recently gained their independence from colonial powers, tend
to incorporate many of the principles enumerated in the U.N.
-Declaration' of Human
Rights into their constitutions. The foregoing documents generally set forth
standards of conduct by governments toward individuals on a day to day basis,
with exceptions for times of public turmoil when the security of the state is
threatened. It is when the security of the state is threatened, that another
set of rules, designed to ensure some minimum observance of humanitarian
principles become applicable. These rules are set forth in various inter-
national conventions such as the Hague Conventions of 1907* restricting the
means which may be employed in the conduct of armed conflicts, 5 and the four
Geneva Conventions which have as their principle goal, the protection of
non-combatants, whether they are legitimate combatants who have been rendered
hors de combat by some means, or whether they are civilians who have had no,
or only limited involvement in the actual fighting. It may quickly be perceived
that while the rules just noted are of a humanitarian nature, they apply to
two different situations. The Hague Conventions are applicable in combat
itself and may properly be termed the laws of war in the strict sense of the

word, while the Geneva Conventions are concerned only with the humane treat-
7
ment of casualties and non-combatants.'
It would seem that the first two 19*+9 Geneva Conventions, i.e. the first
concerned with amelioration of the condition of the sick and wounded in the
field, and the second with the amelioration of the condition of the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, are perhaps more closely
related in the problems of their enforcement, to the laws of war as expressed
in the 1907 Hague Convention, than to those of the third and fourth Geneva
Conventions. For this reason, only the third and fourth Geneva Conventions,
respectively concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war, and the
o
protection of civilian persons in time of war, will be considered.
One of the most evident deficiencies in the enforcement of international
law, is the absence of a centralized sanctioning authority. For this reason,
some writers assert tha^: the international law is unenforceable. ° Probably
in no given area of international law is this assertion more nearly justified
than in the rules governing warfare. The fourth Hague Convention, concerning
the laws of war on land, provides in Article 3, that, "A belligerent party
which violates the provisions... shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation.... 1 ' In the absence of some system to determine how much com-
pensation is due, and the means of assuring payment, this sanction has proven
all but useless, and so far as actually detering illegal action, as contrasted
to monatary compensation after the act, has had no discernable effect at all.
Even this is one step beyond the Geneva Conventions, which contain no specific
sanctions to be applied against errant states. It would thus seem that in the
area in which severe physical suffering is most likely to occur, there are
essentially no means of assuring compliance with the agreed standards of
humane conduct as specified in the various conventions.

The aforementioned observations do not purport to assert that there are
not in fact sanctions which are available and which are utilized. In fact,
there are sanctions in international law. Reprisals of both a military and
non-military nature, are the primary compulsive sanctions in the international
order. But these sanctions are common to any primative decentralized society,
and it would seem that a modern day community of nations should be able to
make some affirmative contribution to advance the system above the primitive
stage.
It is the theme of this article to suggest that at least in some circum-
stances where the issue is primarily one of human rights, the world community
might make a start toward an effective international law sanctioning process.
The third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 19^9> which will be referred to
hereafter as the ROW (prisoner of war) and Civilian Conventions respectively,
have defined in some detail the minimum humanitarian considerations to be
extended to pr isoners-of-war and to non-combatant civilians. The Conventions,
by their existence, demonstrate the awareness of state officials that many of
the most serious atrocities do not necessarily occur on the battlefield, ^
and also affirm through their acceptance by the bulk of nations, the desire
to minimize unnecessary suffering. Yet, the absence of an effective sanctioning
process dilutes the effectiveness of the Conventions at a time when weapons
are becoming more destructive, and warfare in both its psychological aspects
and execution, increasingly involves non-combatants. The need then is for
some effective means of assuring that at least the minimum standards of humane
conduct prevail. It is long past the time when the international community,
for its own benefit, must accept some diminuation of national sovereignty in
exchange for an effective sanctioning process. A logical first step would
seem to be in an area in which the conduct complained of is accepted by

essentially all nations as being illegal, in which it normally extends over a
substantial period of time so as to allow international bodies sufficient
time to react, and where the conduct itself is subject to objective evaluation
by impartial observers. It is suggested that the principles set forth in the
POW and Civilian Conventions meet these criterian.
Any reasoned approach to a sanctioning process for the POW and Civilian
Conventions, must commence with an understanding of the objectives of these
conventions. The Conventions are humanitarian and seek to set standards
whereby the suffering inflicted on non-combatants, whether prisoners-of-war
or civilians, is minimized. They attempt to do this by curbing the action
which may legitimately be taken against civilians or prisoners-of-war, even
though prisoners-of-war or civilians may themselves have violated the accepted
rules of war. 16 The principles set forth apply to all wars and armed conflicts
(though there is argument that the conventions do not apply to internal
conflicts), regardless of whether or not the conflict is "legal" or "just". 17
The standards apply not only to conduct which physically injures a helpless
person, but also to conduct which violates the dignity and honor of the
1 o
individual. The Geneva Conventions are to be applied regardless of race,
religion, nationality or politics, and are intended solely to minimize suffering
19incident to war. It is apparent that the POW and Civilian Conventions are
designed to benefit those individuals who through the fortunes of war cannot
help themselves. The underlying principles embodied in these conventions are
therefore conceptualized in the basic rights to life, and human dignity.
In pursueiog the thesis that a workable system of sanctions could be
implemented, to enforce the third and fourth Geneva Conventions, this article
will evaluate the factual situation in two contemporary conflict arenas (the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Viet-Nam conflict) and will determine whether

there are currently violations of the Geneva Conventions in these arenas as
they relate to civilians and prisoners-of-war. The article will then specify
problems peculiar to those conflict arenas and offer some suggestions as to
why the Geneva Conventions have not been effective there. With this background,
it should be possible to determine the desirable characteristics of an effective
sanctioning process, the considerations which enter into the establishment of
such a process, and a determination of whether political considerations in
the contemporary world would prohibit the establishment of effective sanctions
for the POW and Civilian Conventions. Finally, the article will conclude with
a specific recommendation for empl indentation of an effective sanctioning
process for the POW and Civilian Conventions, a brief evaluation of how such
a system might be applied in the Viet Nam conflict, and the practical diffi-
culties of its application in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
I. Contemporary Wor Id Situations
The plight of civilians and prisoners-of-war in two contrasting conflict
situations will be discussed under this heading. The first subject to be
explored will be the refugees in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This situation
illustrating the classical occupation of territory by a conquering power, may
be contrasted with the circumstances prevailing in South Viet Nam where
civilians are caught in the cross-fire of both conventional and guerrilla
warfare. The plight of prisoners-of-war in the conventional sense will also
be considered in each of these same conflict arenas.
A. Situations involving civilians.
1. Palestine Refugees
The dilemma of the Palestine refugees is so intimately entwined with the
history of Palestine over the past sixty years that it is impossible to

intelligently discuss the matter without first referring to some of the his-
torical material. Changing the name of the territory formerly called Palestine
to its present name of Israel, further complicates the precise designation of
both territory, and groups of people with ties to, or claims on that territory.
For clarity, the following terms will be used throughout this article.
20
Jew - a voluntary adherent to the religious faith of Judaism.
Zionist - refers "...to a member or supporter of the modern political movement
of Zioni sm.. . ,|2 ' which in turn advocates the constitution of the "Jewish
people" as a national entity in which membership is conferred on all Jews. "22
Israel - refers "...to the present Near Eastern State of Israel. "23
Israel
i
-will refer to present Jewish inhabitants of Israel.
Palestine - will be used to refer to the territory prior to 19^8 which is now
included™in the present state of Israel.
Arabs - refer to non-Jew inhabitants of Israel and the neighboring states.
Arab States - refers collectively to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.
Palestinians - designates all inhabitants of Palestine prior to 19*+8.
Palestinian Refugees - identifies those Arabs who formerly resided in Palestine
and whom the Israeli Jews now forbid to re-enter the state of Israel.
a. Background.
Jews claim a historical connection to Palestine which may be traced to
early Biblical times (and which may incidentally account in a large measure for
the general acceptance by the American public that Palestine belongs to the
Jews). The Jews were banished from Palestine in the first century A.D. by
their Roman Conquerers. When the Arabs took the territory from the Romans in
2*4
63*4 A.D., and recinded the Roman decree, few Jews returned to Palestine.
Hence, for about eighteen hundred years, from the first century A.D. until
25
about 1855 when the first Jewish settlements of any size were made in Palestine,
Palestine was virtually devoid of Jews. Between 1855 and 1915, the Jewish
agricultural colonies in Palestine increased until there were about 100,000

26
Jews in Palestine. Although the movement among European Jews to repatriate
Jews to Palestine could possibly trace its existence back to their original
expulsion from Palestine in the first century, this movement was relatively
insignificant until about 1 897 when Theodore Herzi founded the first Zionist
Congress. 2 ' The Zionist organization succeeded in securing from Britain the
Balfour Declaration of 1917 thus paving the way for the establishment of a
"national home for the Jewish people". With the League of Nations mandate
28
assigning Palestine to Britain as a mandated territory, this eventually led
to the formation of the Jewish State of Israel.
It has been maintained that the Balfour Declaration which at the beginning
was merely an agreement between Zionists, Jews and Britain, became an inter-
national instrument when its essential provisions were incorporated into the
29
Palestine Mandate, 7 and though the mandate terminated in 19^8 with the formation
of the state of Israel, the Zionist-Israel claims which continued to be
asserted citing the Balfour Declaration as authority, served, in the absence
of objection by other states to establish the Balfour Declaration as customary
international law.-^ It is thus argued that all clauses of the Balfour Decla-
ration remain effective, which would include those provisions requiring
"...that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine..."^ It may be
questioned whether all the provisions of the Palestine Mandate terminated in
19^8 in the sense that the entire Mandate became void from that time forward,
creating the necessity for the Zionist to revive the Balfour Declaration and
breathe some degree of international character into it to justify the origin
of the Jewish claim to the territory of Israel. It is submitted that what was
terminated in 19^8, was merely the obligation of Britain to act as a Mandatory,
and that those provisions of the Mandate which were necessary to effectuate

8the establishment of a national home for the Jews continued in effect, as did
those clauses of the Mandate requiring respect for the personal status of the
3-3
,
various peoples and communities. J These provisions prohibited discrimination
of any kind on the basis of race, religion or language, and required the
safeguarding of "the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of
35Palestine..." (emphasis added). Valid and convincing evidence has been offered
to prove that when the Balfour declaration was prepared, the British govern-
ment did not intend to provide for the establishment of a Jewi sh State and that
the term "national home" as used in the Balfour Declaration meant something
less than an independent political entity. This position has been repeatedly
asserted by various writers who cite convincing evidence both prior to and sub-
sequent to the Balfour Declaration in support of that position. ' Yet, provi-
sions of the Mandate which establish a Jewish Agency to advise and cooperate
38
with the administration of economic and social matters, to construct or
operate public works, services and utilities and develop the countries natural
39
resources, as well as requiring that the Administration of Palestine "...
facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up
permanent residence in Palestine."
, can hardly be construed in any fashion
other than preparations to eventually create a Jewish state. When these pro-
visions are considered in conjunction with the preamble providing for". . .recon-
'+1
stituting their national home in that country..." there can be no doubt that
the term "national home" was intended by the mandate to be synonomous with a
political entity as opposed to some sort of shrine or park. It would seem,
therefore, that there are difficulties in the assertion that the Balfour
Declaration currently serves as a juridicial basis for the Jewish claims
to Israel, and a literal acceptance of the claim that "The State of
Israel, proclaimed in 19^8, was born from the Zionist claim that the
Jews of the world constitute a separate nation entitled to a land of their

hi
own and sovereign statehood." It is, instead, suggested that the state of
Israel came into being as a direct result of the Mandate, and that Israel was
created with a specific obligation to al
1
Palestinians as particularized in
the Mandate, ^ ancj no t as a haven for Jews alone. It is further suggested
that although the more pertinent provisions of the Balfour Declaration were
written into the Mandate, those provisions were absorbed by the Mandate and
given meaning exclusive of that indicated by the legislative history of the
Balfour Declaration as considered by the appropriate British governmental bodies.
The League members were likely unaware of the internal manuevering incident
to the publication of the Balfour Declaration by Britain, and therefore gave
their own interpretation to the Declaration, which it has earlier been noted,
on its face undoubtedly contemplated the formation of a political entity.
What Britain may or may not have actually intended by the Balfour Declaration
therefore is immaterial as its provisions (but not the Declaration) were given
a new setting and propelled by the League of Nations into International Law.
In either event, whether the Jewish claims to Israel are factually based
on the Mandate or on the Declaration, Israel is at the very least bound by the
limitations contained in one or the other instrument to the effect that the
Civil and religious rights of al
1
Palestinians be safeguarded.
One of the major problems which faced the Zionist in establishing a Jewish
State, was that Palestine was predominately populated by Arabs. There was no
substantial flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine until the 1930's, though
by 19^7 there were approximately 700,000 Jews in Palestine, who through their
secret army, operated against both the Arabs and British. These activities
led the British to advise the General Assembly of the United Nations that
Britain was no longer prepared to act as the Mandatory power, and eventually
led to several proposals before the United Nations to partition Palestine. By
19*48 the state of Israel was a fact.

10
The right of the United Nations to partition Palestine against the wishes
of a majority of the population has justly been assailed and in a juridical
LA
sense is highly questionable. The United Nations however, is a political
not a judicial creature. Although much of the blame for the present plight
of the Palestinian refugees and the Arab-Israeli hostilities must reside with
the United Nations, ' the fact remains that the state of Israel IS, and the
world community will have to cope with the facts as they exist, not as they
might have, or even should have developed.
b. Participants.
The states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the Palestine Refugees,
and various Palestinian Guerrilla movements constitute the primary participants
on one side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other side is Israel and the
Zionist organization. Of secondary importance on the Palestine refugee side
is Russia, the primary source of arms for the Arabs. Of secondary importance
on the Israeli side is the United States, the primary source of arms for Israel.
In addition to their ties to the Palestinians as a result of religion,
economics and geography, the states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt became
the sites of some kO odd refugee camps following the Arab- Israeli war of 19^8.
Immediately following the withdrawal of the British troops in 19^8, Arab
armies unsuccessfully attempted to support Palestinian claims to the land.
During the ensueing war, the victorious Israel considerably expanded its
frontiers as originally determined by the United Nations partition proposal,
*+9
by occupying all of Palestine except the Gaza strip and the West Bank.
Israel has a population of about 2.93 million of which 2.56 million are
Jews, and about 370,000 are of other faiths. It has an area of about 8,000
square miles, u exclusive of the Gaza Strip, the west bank of Jordan, the
Golan Heights of Syria, and Egypt's Sianai Peninsula all of which are presently
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under military occupation by Israel. Israel's immediate neighbors have a
combined population of approximately 45 million people divided among the four
nations as follows; Egypt 3*+ million, Jordan 2,1 million, Lebanon 2.7
53 5*+
million, and Syria 6.3 million. The great majority of these peoples are
Moslem by faith. These four countries have a combined land area of nearly a
half million square miles,-''' though a great portion of the land is either
non-productive or marginally productive. The combination of population and
nonti liable land leads to economic problems, which are more pronounced in
Egypt, than the other three countries.-'
c . C 1 a i ms
According to Israel spokesmen and other sources, the armed forces in
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, with support from Saudi Arabia and the
Yeman marched against Israel on May )k, 19*+8, the day of Israel's declaration
of Independence. Israel is therefore frequently characterized as a young
nation struggling for survival against larger hostile neighboring states and
forced to elect survival over the technical observance of rules of international
58
law. The Palestine refugee problem is, according to Israel, the direct
result of the attacks on Israel by the several Arab armies previously mentioned,
59
and accordingly the responsibility for the refugees lies with those states.
Israel therefore maintains that those states should absorb the refugees within
their own economies, as Israel has absorbed Jews from other lands within her
60
boundaries.
The Arab position and the evidence which supports that position does not
portray the picture so clearly, although from a practical standpoint, the
Israeli position would appear to have some merit.
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In determining whether Israel has violated the Civilian Geneva Convention,
it could be asserted that one need look no further than the findings of the
U.N. commission on Human Rights, and the several resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly. On March 22, 1972, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
passed a resolution charging that Israel had violated the provisions of the
civilian convention by her declared intentions to annex portions of occupied
Arab territory; the establishment of Israeli settlements in those territories;
the destruction of villages and houses and confiscation and expropriation of
property; denying refugees the right to return to their homes; the collective
punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners, and the holding of prisoners
incommunicado. This finding by the Human Rights Commission followed a
United Nations General Assembly resolution on December 6, 1971 stating that
Israel had violated Articles h$ and 53 of the Civilian Convention by destroying
refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip and sending the occupants to other areas,
including areas outside the Gaza Strip. On December 20, 1971> the Ger^eral
Assembly again asserted that Israel had violated the Civilian Convention and
called upon Israel to comply with the Convention and to cease specified acts
which were violative of the Convention. * (These acts are the same as those
noted earlier in this paragraph as having been found by the Human Rights
Commission to violate the Civilian Convention.) Although these actions by the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission merit consideration, it must
be recalled that these determinations were made by a political rather than
judicial body, and should not be taken at face value without some independent
investigation. Accordingly, the positions of Israel and the Arab parties
(including the Palestine refugees and the Arab States) will now be reviewed.
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(1) Claims Concerning the Responsibility for creating the Palestine
Refugee Population.
It has been observed that the Palestine Mandate, whereby a national home
for the Jews was to be established in Palestine, was from its inception
destined to result in bitter antagonism between the immigrant Jews and the
resident Palestinians. The plan to move immigrants into a land already settled,
with its own culture and long developed Arabic society did not contemplate the
absorption of the immigrants into this existing society, but rather the
6k
imposition of a new society in the image of the newcomers. With the imple-
mentation of this plan
,
antagonism between the immigrant Jews and the Pales-
tinian Arabs was accelerated, ultimately resulting in the Arab states attacking
Israel in 19^+8 in support of the Palestinians' claim to land within the
Israeli portion of Palestine as partitioned by the United Nations. It was this
war which resulted in the great bulk of Palestinian Refugees. Israel main-
tains that the refugees voluntarily left Palestine when they were urged by
their leaders and the surrounding Arab states to seek shelter in the Arab
states and await Israel's defeat, at which time they would return and share
in the spoils of war. ^ The Arabs on the other hand, maintain that the
Palestinian refugees who left Israel were freightened out by regular Israeli
military units and Israel guerrilla units, which threatened the Arabs with
death and reminded them of the fate of the inhabitants of Keir Yassin, a town
in which essentially all who resided there, men, women and children were
66
killed by Israeli guerrillas. Although one could argue that the Israeli
government could not be held responsible for the actions of guerrilla forces
not a part of her regular military units, this argument rings hollow when it
is noted that the members of those units are now paid the same war pensions
67
as regular troops. At the very least Israel by this action, ratified the

actions of the guerrilla units and they should therefore be chargeable to the
state of Israel.
Whatever the reason, something in excess of 800,000 Palestinian Arabs
68
did either seek refuge in neighboring Arab states, or were forced to go there,
depending on whether one gives credence to the Arab or the Israeli accounts.
It is further asserted that during the six day war in June, 19&7, Israel
again expelled many Arabs from the West Bank of Jordan, an area now occupied
69
by Israeli troops. There are then at least two major groups of Palestinian
refugees, one from the 19^8 war and one from the 1967 war. Doubtless, some
of the refugees expelled from the West Bank were among those who originally
fled Israel in 19^8 and have now twice fled the advancing Israelis.
The Israeli officials apparently expected the Palestinian refugees to be
.assimilated into the economics of the surrounding states. As early as 19^9,
the Prime Minister of Israel stated that Israel considered the solution to the
70
refugee problem was their settlement in the surrounding Arab States. This
position has not changed over the years, and indeed Israeli officials now seem
to be somewhat perplexed that the refugees have not become integrated into
71
the economics of these states. Instead, the refugees continue to live in
refugee camps subsisting in large measure through various international
assistance programs.
It has been urged that Israel has improperly linked the Palestine
refugee problem to peace settlements with the surrounding Arab states.
The rationale of this argument appears to be the proposition that removing
the refugees from the territory of the currounding Arab states, is not
an obligation owed to the Arab states, but is instead an obligation owed
to the individual refugees as inhabitants of the territory occupied by
73Israel.'-' Indeed, when the overall picture presented by the refugees is
considered, it is sometimes difficult to recall that when numbers
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such as a half-million or a million refugees are mentioned, the subject is not
just so many ciphers, but instead a single individual human being who has lost
his house, his livlihood and his homeland; multiplied a million times. When
viewed in this light, the problem stands forth as a purely humanitarian one.
Aside however, from the humanitarian aspects of the Palestine refugee
problem, there stands the juridical problem of whether the official conduct of
Israel toward the Palestinians has violated the civilian convention. Article
49 of the convention provides in part that "Individual or mass forcible trans-
fers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to
the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, occupied
or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."?4 The fact that Israel
asserts that the refugees from Palestine lef t. voluntari ly at the urging of
Arab leaders, and that the Arab states and the refugees themselves insist that
Israeli troops and guerrilla units forced them out of Israel, would tend to
indicate that both sides conceive the forcible evacuation of the population
as an essential ingredient to a violation of Article 1*9. It is here suggested
that the stimulus which caused the refugees to leave Israel is immater ial
,
and it does not matter whether their departure from areas under attack or
which were considered to be dangerous, was voluntary or not. The essence of
Article k3 is that the civilian population will not be involuntarily separated
from their area of residence. That separation may be as effectively accompli-
shed by denying access to the area after the residents have fled to safety
from whatever cause, as from loading them into trucks and carting them away.
It is the basic right to continue residing in one's home territory after danger
has passed that is the essence of the Article. Israel has clearly violated
the first clause of Article fc9 , regardless of whether one accepts the Israeli
or Arab version of why the inhabitants left.
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Even though Israel has violated the first clause of Article *t9 of the
Convention, it is a rare case which does not have two sides, with some varying
degrees of merit on each. It is thus necessary to ascertain if there is any
justifiable reason under international law for the present and past actions
of Israel in excluding the Palestinian refugees from Israel.
The second clause of Article k3 provides:
"...(T)he Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation
of a given area if the Security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied
territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid
such displacement. Persons evacuated shall be transferred back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have
ceased."'
5
The second clause of Article hj would seem to incorporate the concept of
•military necessity 1 into the article and so permit the evacuation of the
population from an area if their security, or the military situation dictated.
From the Israeli point of view it could be argued that the initial evacuation
of the Arab population was for their own safety as the entire area was under
attack, and that their continued expulsion from the area is necessary because
the Refugees themselves have since become a military threat to the state of
Israel. Following the Arab's departure from Israel and their location in
refugee camps in the surrounding Arab states, guerrilla units were organized
76
and trained to carry out operations against Israel. With the assistance of
the Arab states, these groups initiated armed attacks by guerrilla bands
against Israeli military objectives and participated in terrorist activity
against the general population of Israel in their efforts to harrass Israel,
and eventually recover the territory which had been Palestine. With Israel's
occupation of substantial portions of the Arab states during the 1967 war,




>ng the populations of the occupied areas.'' Israel can therefore argue
with some justification that the guerrilla movements which are harbored among
the Palestine refugees demonstrateabl y pose a military threat to the state of
Israel, and therefore their continued exclusion from Israel complies with the
second clause of Article ^9.
On the other hand, the guerrilla spokesmen are quick to point out that
the Palestinian people who were expelled from their land and homes by the
Israelis were entitled to assistance from the United Nations to ensure imple-
mentation of that part of the Mandate which assured that the civil rights of
Palestinians would not be effected by the establishment of a national home for
the Jews, and that when no action was forthcoming, they had no choice but to
organize and fight as best they could to regain their homeland. ?8 As might
be expected, given the experience of the refugees, their goal now is the
expulsion of all Jews from what is now Israel. 79 In pursuit of this goal, the
Palestinian Guerrillas have resorted to terror tactics. Although a "successful 1
terror attack may serve to bolster the morale of the guerrilla units, ^° and
harrass the Israelis, it is likely that such attacks on non-military objectives
serve to portray the Palestine refugees as senseless murderers. Such tactics
are likely a major contributing factor to the U.S. apathy toward the circum-
stances of the refugees. Actions such as hiring foreign communist oriented
radicals to conduct a suicide attack on unarmed civilians as happened in
TelAviv on May 30, 1972, and resulted in the murder of 26 people and the
81
wounding of 81 others, and the attempt to train and infiltrate guerrillas
into other countries not directly concerned with the Jewish occupation of
.
82
Israel, can only serve to destroy any support the refugees were entitled to
expect from the non-communist states. Indeed some members of the committee of
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the United Nations Relief and Works Agency have already indicated that their
governments question the propriety of increasing aid to the Palestine refugees,
as a result of various acts of air piracy and the terrorist activities of
83
Arab guerri 1 las.
The Arab guerrillas then would seem to have given some considerable support
to the proposition that the repatriation of the Palestine refugees in Israel
would pose a military threat to Israel, and continued terrorist activity by
the guerrillas could conceivably even erode the support for the Palestine
refugees that has been evidenced by the numerous General Assembly resolutions
and findings of the Human Rights Commission.
From a purely juridical point of view however, an assertion by Israel
that the refugees pose a military threat to Israel and may thus be excluded
from the territory must fail. For the second clause of Article k9 also pro-
vides that except in the case where it is impossible to avoid such displacement,
protected persons will not be moved outside the boundaries of the occupied
territory; and if such displacement is necessary, they will be returned to
their homes immediately upon cessation of active hostilities. 8^ It is
manifestly clear that Israel did not comply with either of these provisions.
The nearest Israel has come to indicating a willingness to readmit Palestinian
refugees to Israel, unconnected with a permanent peace settlement with the
Arab countries, was in 19^9 when the Israel delegation indicated at peace talks
then in progress, that Israel was willing to accept the refugees (totaling
about 270,000 persons) and the regular inhabitants then located in the Gaza
Strip, provided
-the Gaza Strip was annexed by Israel. 85
It must be concluded that even accepting the initial dislocation of the
Arabs from Palestine as legal under the provision of Article k9, the continued
exclusion of those persons from Israel after active hostilities ceased, is a
violation of Article hS of the Civilian Convention.
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(2) Claims concerning individually owned Arab Property in Israel and
Occupied Territories.
Reliable and impartial information concerning the treatment accorded
Arabs residing in Israel and areas occupied by Israel is not readily available.
Most of the materials on the subject have either been prepared by Zionist or
by Arabic sources, or by persons sympathetic to one side or the other and are
therefore of questionable validity. It could be argued that the impartial
reports by the International Red Cross reflecting that students from the Gaza
Strip are permitted to travel back and forth between the university in Cairo
86
and their homes in Gaza, indicate that the Israelis are making every effort
to treat the occupants of that territory in a fair and equitable manner.
Additionally, the International Red Cross has disclosed that between
June 1969 and September 1 97 1 it has arranged for over 55,000 visits to prisoners
87
and Arab civilians who are detained in Israel or occupied territories. While
indicating that the allegation by the Human Rights Commission that Arabs are
88
held incommunicado may be open to question, this figure also establishes
that in fact considerable numbers of Arabs are either detained or confined.
This immediately raises the question as to whether the prolonged detainment
of Arab civilians and military personnel is in violation of Article k2 of the
89 90Civilian Convention, and Article 118 of the POW Convention. Only the
question relating to civilians will be considered at this point. At the
outset, it would appear that the detained Arab civilians are treated with some
9
1
degree of consideration during their detention. They are permitted visitors,
92
are permitted to receive and transmit messages to their families, and the
International Red Cross is permitted to visit and talk with Arab Detainees in
93
private. The question then is whether the detention itself is a violation
of Article k2 of the Civilian Convention which provides for internment only
9*+
so long as absolutely necessary. Israel would maintain that the civilian

20
detainees have been either directly or indirectly involved in guerrilla or
terrorist activity, and have proven themselves a threat to Israel's security.
Except to consider each detainee on a case by case basis, it is impossible
to determine with any degree of certainty whether these individuals are being
illegally detained. The boasts of Arab guerrillas as to the extent of their
95
activities ' would seem to portray a large number of individuals involved in
those activities, which would in turn be expected to generate a considerable
number of captives. It must therefore be concluded that at least in the great
majority of cases, Arab civilians are not being illegally detained in violation
of the Geneva Convention.
The Palestinian Arabs maintain that Israel has taken real properties of
those persons who fled Palestine during the 19^8 war. The land which belonged
to refugees is alleged to have been sold by an official Israeli custodian to
a
P
eve 1 opment Authority
,
which it is charged, was expressly created by the
96
state to liquidate Arab refugee property. It has been charged that approxi-
mately 450,000 forms asserting ownership of property in Israel by Palestinian
97
refugees have been prepared and filed with the United Nations. The importance
to Israel of the land involved is emphasized when it is considered that at the
time of the 1 9^+9 Armistice between Israel and the surrounding Arab states,
98
over one half of the cultivatable land was owned by Arabs. Israel on the
Other hand asserts that the property of the Arabs who fled during the 19^8
war, then became the property of Israel. " The juridical basis for this
change in title is not evident. It is here submitted that the fact that a
civilian, whatever his race or religion, who avails himself of the privilege
under Article 35 of the Civilian Convention to leave the area of conflict,
is entitled to do so, and to return when the immediate danger is past without
having lost his right to ownership of property necessarily left behind. It
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would be a strange rule of humanitarian law which provided for ones immediate
safety only on condition that he forfeit all his property rights. Although
Article 33 prohibits pillage and reprisals against property, and Article
53 prohibits destruction of real property except for absolute military
102
necessity, no Article of the Civilian Convention would seen to directly
prohibit the confiscation of individual real property by an Occupying Power.
It would seem, however, that the purpose of Article 53 is to preserve the
property of individuals. Since the seizure of the real property itself is
more harmful to the owner than is the destruction of the buildings on it, it
would follow that if the seizure of private real property is permitted, though
its destruction is prohibited, the purpose of the Article would be frustrated.
Additionally, the international rule permitting an occupying power to admin-
103ister and enjoy the use of real property belonging to the occupied state,
would, by implication, seem to prohibit the taking of individually owned real
property. The last clause of Article h$ which prohibits an Occupying Power
from transferring part of its own population to an occupied territory would
further establish a prohibition against the seizure of privately owned real
property. Thus if the purpose of Article 53 is effectuated, it is clear that
the confiscation without compensation of privately owned real property is
contrary to that Article.
It has been charged that there has been needless destruction of homes in
the absence of military operations, contrary to Article 53 of the Civilian
10^Convention, ' and that houses and shops have been destroyed in reprisal for
their owners alleged involvement in activities designed to undermine the
Israeli government. Although reprisals normally permit the use of other-
wise illegal means of warfare when necessary to deter an enemy from continuing
illegal conduct, Article 33 specifically exempts from reprisal action,
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reprisals against both protected persons and their property. Also it has
been claimed that Israel practiced looting on a large scale, specifically in
Kuneitra in the Golan Heights pf Syria. Article 33 specifically prohibits
109
pi I lage.
(3) Has Israel violated the Civilian Convention respecting '.:•
Arab property located within the state of Israel and territory
occupied in 19^8?
Without doubt Israel has violated the Civilian Convention by destroying
individually owned real property in areas occupied in 1967. Officially
sanctioned looting or looting on such a scale as to charge commanders with
knowledge of the activity, ' in areas occupied in 19&7 also violate the
Civilian Convention. A different issue, however, is posed as to the same
activity within the boundaries of Israel, since if Israel's action is taken
within her own boundaries, the Civilian Convention would not be applicable.
It is therefore necessary to determine the actual status of the territory over
which Israel claims sovereignty.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution for the partition of
Palestine provided;
"Independent Arab and Jewish states and the Special International
Regime for the City of Jerusalem. . .shal 1 come into existence. . .not
later than 1 October 19*+8. The boundaries of the Arab State, the
Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described..."
The attack on the proposed Jewish state by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon
before the resolution could be fully executed (The Arabs would not accept the
resolution), resulted in Israel conquering most of the area which would have
constituted the Arab State. The Armistice agreements signed on 2k February,
19^9 between Israel and the four Arab nations established armistice boundaries,
but provided that the boundaries were to be construed as ceasefire boundaries
and should not be regarded as a settlement of the Palestine question. The
agreement with Egypt was most emphatic on this point;
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"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be considered in any
sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated
without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either
Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the
Palestine question."
Under the generally accepted principles of international law, an armistice
merely provides for a temporary cessation of active combat, and does not
1 1*+
resolve the cause of the conflict or establish permanent boundaries. It is
submitted that the same General Assembly resolution which brought Israel into
being also created an Arab State, since if the United Nations had the power to
divide Palestine against the wishes of a majority of the people, its resolution
establishing a Jewish state must have likewise established an Arab state,
even against the wishes of the Arabs. It follows that when Israel occupied
the territory designated for the Arab state, it effectively occupied the
embryo state. At the very least, the occupation of that territory by Israel,
whether the fledging Arab state had reached a de jure existence or not,
constituted an invasion of territory not belonging to Israel, since the
Resolution defined Israel's boundaries, and the subsequent Armistice agreement
could not rescind the applicability of the Convention to Arabs located in those
occupied areas. The subsequent claim of Israel to sovereignty over this
territory and the apparent acceptance of this claim by most states would not
116
alter that obligation. The purpose of the Civilian Convention is to afford
protection to individuals located in an area occupied by a foreign force. It
is not concerned with the establishment of boundaries. In any event many of
the charges leveled against Israel occurred prior to the Armistice, and even
assuming for the sake of argument that Israel's claim to sovereignty over the
territory, did at some indeterminate time ripen into de jure sovereignty,
Israel certainly has not accepted the Arabs as Israeli nationals. Even then,
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conceeding the sovereignty of Israel over all the territory claimed, the
individuals within those boundaries are still within the protection of the
principles set forth in the Civilian Convention which provides:
"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict
or occupying Power of which they are not nationals."'''
It must be noted however that Israel's violation of the principles of
the Convention is not alone determinative of whether sancti ons.even if currently
available could be applied against Israel respecting violations which occurred
in the 19^8 war. For the Civilian Convention was not drafted until August,
19*+9. This matter will be discussed later in this paper (VII B).
(h) Violations of the Civilian Convention Respecting Territory occupied
in the 1 967 War.
In the 1967 war between Israel, and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Israeli
troops occupied Egypt's Sinai Penninsula and the Gaza Strip, Syria's Golan
118
Heights and the West Bank of Jordan. It has been charged that Israel is
1 19
making numerous Jewish settlements in all of these territories, and that
Israel's refusal to withdraw from those areas proves it is pursueing a course
120
of expansion through conquest. There is substantial evidence from Israel
itself to establish both of these allegations as to territory occupied in 19&7*
Announcements of officially established settlements in the Gaza Strip have
1 21
recently been made, and Israel has officially expressed its intention to
1 22
annex the Gaza Strip.
The Jewish settlement of the areas occupied by Israel in 1 967 without
doubt violates Article kS of the Civilian Convention which provides, "The
Occupying power shall not... transfer part of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies. " 12 3 Nonetheless, the Israeli position is
not entirely without merit. The areas in question have long been sites of
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guerrilla activity launched against Israel, and anoccassion for minor inci-
dents between the regular armed forces of Israel and the other countries.
Golan Heights is of considerable strategic value located as it is above agri-
culture lands occupied and farmed by Israelis. Israel has alleged that this
area had been used to launch attacks on the Israeli settlements, and there
were therefore numerous incidents between Syria and Israel in that area prior
1 2k
to 1967. Forcing the Palestine refugees from their homes into camps in
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, in Lebanon, and in Syria and their remaining
in these camps for many years, is doubtless the reason for the many acts of
terrorism and retaliatory raids launched back and forth across the demarcation
125
lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 19^+9. Nonetheless the
incidents did take place and in many cases the guerrillas likely had the
unofficial backing of the state in which they were located. These states
then can not be absolved from responsibility for these attacks. However, since
the I967 ceasefire, the Arab states have made some considerable effort to
1 26
curb the guerrilla activity being waged from within their borders. This
pressure by the Arab governments has been somewhat effective in recent months, '
but it must be conceded that the example set by Israel in literally seizing
the property from which such attacks had previously taken place was not lost
on the Arab states. Given Israel's past record for seizing and retaining
terri tory when the opportunity presented itself, the surrounding states are
likely acting in self-interest rather than through any concern for the welfare
of Israeli residents. Israel's practice of seizing and retaining territory
from which guerrilla attacks have been launched does have some merit, however.
In 1956 Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula following a pro-
1 ?Rlonged period of guerrilla attacks from those areas. These territories




Emergency Force. Israel's apparent assumption that this arrangement would
stop the border raids proved to be ill-founded, and in 1967 Israel was again
at war. The Israelis then have a plausible reason based on their military
, no
security for the continued occupancy of these areas since 1967.
Despite Israel's assumed military justification for the retention of the
areas occupied in 1967, this is not a unique situation. With some exceptions,
every state could enhance its national security by creating a buffer zone at
the expense of its neighbors. The point involved in this paper, and the point
emphasized in the last clause of Article k$ of the Civilian Convention pro-
hibiting the transfer of an occupying state's civilian population into occupied
territory, '* is the protection of the vested rights of the population already
1 32
located in that territory occupied by the occupying power. Article **9 is
in treaty form, the formal recognition of the principle that a state should
not be permitted to expand its borders by military action against its
1 33
neighbors. From a humanitarian point of view, it need only be noted that
Israel's initial expansion in 19^8 and subsequent expansion in 19&7 was
accomplished by seizing that area designated by the United Nations as an Arab
State, the expulsion of Arabs from the area, or at the very least the refusal
to permit them to return to their homes, and the seizure of their property.
It should not be forgotten that for every Jew settled on a farm in Israel,
an Arab became the unwilling tenant of a refugee camp in a neighboring state.
(5) Israel's violation of the Civilian Convention confirmed.
The foregoing discussion of the circumstances of Israel's occupation of
certain areas and the disposition of property located therein, establish as a
minimum that Israel has violated Article 33 of the Civilian Convention, by
permitting her soldiers to participate in widespread looting, and by the
unnecessary destruction of real property belonging to Arabs in occupied
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territory. Israel has also violated Article h$ by refusing to permit those
Arabs who fled in 19^8 and 19&7 t0 return to their homes, and by settling
Israelis on land occupied in the 19^+8 and 1967 wars. Israel has further
unnecessarily destroyed numerous homes and seized individually owned real
property in violation of Article 53 of the Civilian Convention. Even though
it is possible that other violations have been committed, the foregoing
violations as a minimum indicate the need for some means to enforce the
Civilian Convention as respects individual property rights in and around Israel
In the last analysis where individual real property rights are concerned, the
seizure of real property by one state and its settlement by nationals of the
occupying state, in reality involves the stripping of one group of individuals
of their property through armed force, and awarding it to other individuals
based on their nationality.
2. Civilians in Viet Nam.
The war between North and South Viet Nam of which the Viet Cong guerrilla
movement is a part, has been particulari 1y difficult for the civilian popula-
tion in South Viet Nam. In addition to the standard conventional warfare with
more or less fixed military positions and lines which have prevailed since
April 1972, the civilian populace in South Viet Nam have been confronted with
years of guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity along with other periods of
more or less conventional warfare.
a. Background
Following over seven years of war in Indo-China between France and the
vietmnh, the Geneva accords were reached in 195^ terminating active
1 35hostilities in that area. At the outset there were serious problems with
the agreements as they pertained to Viet Nam. In the first instance, the
South Vietnamese delegation considered the agreement to be made as one
constituting only a cease-fire and not a political settlement. 1 ^ It
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questioned the authority of France to bind it to a cease-fire without its
137
consent. The South Vietnamese further considered its military position
perilous since the North Vietnamese had a strong independent military force
toughened by several years fighting, while South Viet Nam's army was, at the
best, of questionable effectiveness. * South Viet Nam's fears were borne
out as the North Vietnamese began immediately in 195^ and over the next five
139
years to establish communist cadres in South Viet Nam. As the Communist
political activity increased in South Viet Nam, frequently accompanied by
acts of terrorism, the North Vietnamese began to supplement their cadres in
the South with regular army troops.
As the Military and terrorist pace quickened in South Viet Nam, one of
the primary claims put forth by North Viet Nam in justification for its
involvement in the south, was the refusal of South Viet Nam to permit the
elections called for by Article 7 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva
Accords. - South Viet Nam countered this charge by pointing out that it
1 1t?had never agreed to, and had in fact objected to the election provision,
and that these provisions demanded;
"...(T)he settlement of political problems, effected on the basis
of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial
integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental
freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret ballot. "1^3
South Viet Nam could further point to the internal situation in North Viet Nam
which degenerated the political processes in that country to that of a police
state, and which assured that any elections held in North Viet Nam would not be
a free expression of the will of the people, but would instead merely mirror
the official Communist government's position. That position is clearly
spelled out in the North Vietnamese constitution:
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"...(l)n the south, the U.S. imperalists and their henchmen have
been savagely repressing the patriotic movement of our people...
But our Southern compatriots have constantly struggled heroically
and refused to submit to them.... The cause of peaceful reunification
of the Tatherland will certainly be victorious. .. .Under the clear-
sighted leadership of the VietNam Lao Dong Party. ..our entire
people, broadly united within the National United Front, will
surely win glorious success in the building of socialism in North
Viet Nam and the struggle for national reunification..."' 4 -'
It is thus the stated national policy of North Viet Nam to unify North
and South Viet Nam. North Viet Nam's involvement in South Viet Nam is directed
to this end. In its quest to unify Viet Nam under a Communist regime, North
Viet Nam is assisted by Russia and Communist China, both of which provide
supplies and arms as well as advisers.
b. Participants
The United States has been interested in the Vietnam situation since
immediately following World War II, and participated in the negotiations
1 46
leading up to the Geneva accords of 195^» Its ultimate committment of
combat troops, aerial and naval support was made pursuant to the Southeast
1/47
Asia Collective Defense treaty which was also the basis for committment
148
of Military personnel by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.
While there is disagreement among authorities as to the legality of the United
149States involvement in Viet Nam under both international and municipal law,
the respective legalities of the involvement of the United States combat
personnel cannot alter the undisputed proposition that these personnel are in
fact involved in combat operations. The resulting battle casualties involving
both military personnel and civilians, are the same, regardless of which
formalities were or were not observed at any given time preceding the actual
commencement of hostilities.
It is apparent then, that the primary combatants in Viet Nam are South
Viet Nam and the United States on one side, and North Viet Nam and those
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Communist cadres established by North Viet Nam in the South (Viet Cong) on
the other. Though not actually known to be engaged in the fighting in South
Viet Nam, Communist China and Russia also exert great influence on the course
of the war by providing materials and advice to North Viet Nam and therefore are
involved in the conflict to that extent.
c. Acts Directed Toward Civilians.




ians in both North and South Viet Nam
have come under fire. The South Vietnamese civilians have been the object of
attacks by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers. Additionally, there have
doubtless been incidents in which South Vietnamese soldiers and American
troops have either purposefully of accidently brought South Vietnamese
civilians under fire. There are of course in any war, those atrocities
committed by incapable leaders such as the My Lai incident charged to Lt.
William L. Calley, Jr., U.S. Army, in which at least 109 civilians, men,
150
women, and children, were murdered. Such atrocities inevitably happen on
both sides in a war, and My Lai has its counterpart in numerous attacks by
both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese against South Vietnamese civilians.
A case in point is the attack by a North Vietnamese sapper battalion on the
families of regional force members in a small South Vietnamese village in which
gernades and rifles were used to kill an estimated 100 women and children, '
and a similar attack at Dak Son in which the Viet Cong used flamethrowers and
firearms to kill 252 women and children after first isolating the militamen
away from town. '52 /\ s grim as these stories portray the fate of non-combatants
caught up in a War, such incidents are beyond the scope of this article. Such
conduct comes within the Laws of War as expressed in the Hague Conventions
and the Nuremberg Trials. Even then it has been observed that the laws of
war provide precious little protection for non-combatants in an area of
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hostilities.^" This article however, is only concerned with civilians in
occupied territory.
At the outset it should be noted that whereas in the Arab-Israeli conflict
the concern was primarily with property rights, in the Vietnamese arena the
concern is almost exclusively with two articles of the Civilian Convention
designed to protect the person of individuals in an occupied area. Article
27 states in part:
"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honour, their family rights. . .They shall
at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults
and public curi osi ty."'5*+
Article 32 further amplifies the protection to be afforded civilians:
"The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is
prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause
the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their
hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, (and) torture..."
It is these two articles to which reference will frequently be made in
the remainder of this section.
(1) Acts directed towards civilians by the Viet Cong.
Although the Viet Cong have committed many atrocities which violate the
provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention, now accepted as customary international
law, there are few instances in which it can definitely be asserted that they
have violated the provisions of the Civilian Convention, This is because
they seldom "occupy" an area within the sense that they control the government
and the people, and establish militarily enforced demarcation lines between
areas they control and that the South Vietnamese government controls. None-
theless, they exert considerable control in some areas and have committed
many atrocities in those areas. During the period from January 1966 through
1969, over ^,000 individuals were killed or abducted by the Viet Cong.
Typical instances are those in which a Viet Cong official and two executioners
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entered a compound of canal workers, charged that someone had been informing
on the guerrillas in that area, and directed gunfire that killed eighteen men,
157
a woman and four small children as they lay in their beds, There are areas
over which the Viet Cong seem to have marginal control, at least to the extent
that they can hold prisoners for long periods of time. Such a case was Lan
Van Sang, a farmer who was arrested by the Viet Cong, kept in captivity for
four months while chained to eleven other prisoners, and then left for dead
with the eleven after the Viet Cong cut their throats and stabbed them on the
158
approach of government troops. Still, however., even in such marginally
controlled areas, where the Viet Cong could for several months hold a group
of a dozen persons prisoner undetected, it is considered extremely doubtful
that the Civilian Convention is applicable. Such an area can best probably
be described as a "no-man's" land.
There has been at least one period of time in which the Viet Cong have
controlled territory to the extent that they "occupied" it within the context
of the Civilian Convention. During the Tet offensive in 1968, Viet Cong
cadres occupied several areas in South Viet Nam. One of these areas was Hue.
During the time they occupied Hue, the Viet Cong killed approximately 5,800
civilians. The bodies of most of these victims were found in single and mass
graves throughout the province surrounding Hue. 7 In some areas the victims
had been tied together in groups of 10 to 20, placed in front of open mass
160
graves and shot. These killings were done by local Viet Cong Cadres and
were part of an overall plan to eliminate individuals of stature who were
161
loyal to the South Vietnamese government.
The Viet Cong, have therefore violated Articles 27 and 32 of the Civilian
Convention. The difficulty that remains however, is whether the Viet Cong,
not being signatories to the Civilian Convention, could be made the subject
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of sanctions for their failure to observe the provisions of Articles 27 and 32,
These Articles set forth principles which are embodied in Article 46 of the
162
1907 Hague Convention. The Court in the Nuremberg trials held that:




civilian population of or in occupied territory.
. ,ki 1 ling of
hostages. ..wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages',
shall be a war crime. In the main these provisions are declatory
of the existing laws of war as expressed in the Haaue Convention.
Article 46..." r6 3
In a different decision the court opined;
"In stating that the Hague and Geneva Conventions express
accepted usages and customs of war, it must be noted that
certain detailed provisions pertaining to the care and treat-
ment of prisoners of war can hardly be so designated. Such
details it is believed could be binding only by international
agreement.. ." I0H
The conduct of the Viet Cong, by violating substantive provisions of the
.Civilian Convention also violates the accepted rules of warfare. Although
such conduct would properly be triable as a war crime, it cannot be maintained
that the provisions of the Civilian Convention itself are binding on the Viet
Cong.
Article
1 of the Civilian Convention obligates each "High Contracting
Power" to "...respect and to ensure respect for the present convention in all
165
circumstances." Or. Pictet, in his commentary on the Geneva Conventions
has asserted that the term "to ensure respect", demands that the Contracting
Parties should make every effort to ensure universal compliance with the
principles enunciated in the conventions. 166 Article 1 of the Civilian
Convention would thus seem to require that all nations apply whatever sanctions
are necessary to ensure that all parties to a conflict observe at least the.
substantive provisions of the Civilian Convention, whether or not these
parties have acceded to, or have standing to accede to the convention.'
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Regardless of the moral obligation which nations have to ensure compliance
with the humanitarian principles of the Civilian Convention, the general terms
used in Article 1 are not explicit enough to ensure that states not directly
involved will actually intervene to assure compliance. In fact the experience
in Viet Nam, the Middle East and in Korea has proven just the opposite. The
mass murders at Hue points out an area in the Civilian Convention which
requires some clarification, with specific obligations spelled out. At the
present time however, it is suggested that even if the Civilian Convention
provided a sanctioning process, it is unlikely that the sanctions would be
applied to the Viet Cong or other such guerrilla organizations, in the absence
of provisions specifically making such organizations subject not only to the
substantive provisions of the convention, but, also to the sanctions for their
breach.
(2) Acts directed toward Civilians by the North Vietnamese
Regular Military Units.
Although the North Vietnamese have had troops in South Viet Nam for
several years, it is only within the past four months, since April, 1972, that
North Viet Nam has "occupied" a defined area in South Viet Nam for any period
of time. The manner in which the North Vietnamese have treated civilians in
the occupied area cannot be determined until the North Vietnamese are forced
out of the currently occupied areas. At least one account concerning the
conduct of the North Vietnamese has come to light as the result of South
Vietnamese airborne troops recapturing the village Haixuan, a few miles south
of Quantri City. On this occassion, the North Vietnamese formed a "defense
force" of boys and girls between the ages of 17 and 21. These people were
armed by the North Vietnames with captured M-16 rifles, given minimal training
and placed under the control of North Vietnamese officers. When the South
Vietnamese counter-attacked the North Vietnamese withdrew, taking the newly
1 (\iformed militia with them. '
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Article 51 of the Civilian Convention prohibits an occupying power from
compelling protected persons to serve in either its armed or auxiliary forces,
and from exerting pressure or promulgating propaganda aimed at securing
1 68
voluntary enlistment. North Viet Nam then has clearly violated this
article of the Civilian Convention.
As previously noted, the extent of North Viet Nam's violations will not
be known until the North Vietnamese troops are repelled. However, some
indication of what might be expected may be gleaned from the activity of the
Viet Cong at Hue, the North Vietnamese conduct in Haixuan (conscripting the
civilian population), and the general attitude of the North Vietnamese toward
civilians in the conflict area. Capt. Harold Moffett, a U.S. Adviser at Anloc
has stated that he saw a communist tank massacre 100 women and children inside
a church at Anloc. He further reported that later in the day North Vietnamese
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artillery shelled a hospital, killing all of its occupants. An observation
such as that made by Captain Moffett could be dismissed as just one of those
misfortunes bound to happen in a war if it were not for other information
indicating that direct attacks against civilians is an integral part of the
North Vietnamese strategy. An interview with two colonels who defected from
the North Vietnamese Army during the Tet Offensive in 1968 illustrates the
attitude of the North Vietnamese military toward civilians.
"Both men. ..stated that if they had massacred civilians even
needlessly, they would not have been punished by their superiors.
Should the bloodshed subsequently be judged unnecessary, or even
damaging to the communist cause, they would have had to confess
that their judgment had been faulty, and promise to make efforts
to improve their understanding; but they would have received no
punishment. If, on the other hand, they had avoided a massacre
of civilians for humanitarian reasons and thereby failed to




The attitude portrayed in the several foregoing instances is one of
total disregard for the Geneva Conventions and the internationally accepted
rules of war. They may give some indication of what will be disclosed when
the North Vietnamese are forced out of South Viet Nam. At this stage of the
hostilities, the uncertainty as to exactly what is happening behind the enemy
lines highlights the need for an impartial inspection team at the site of the
conflict.
North Viet Nam has acceded to the Geneva Conventions, including the
Civilian Convention, with two reservations which are concerned only with
procedural, not substantive matters, and are not pertinent within the context
of this thesis. 1 ''' North Viet Nam might maintain that the Civilian Convention
is not applicable because the Geneva Accords divided Viet Nam into two zones
rather than two countries and there can be no occupation of a state's own
territory. Regardless of what was contemplated by the 195*+ Geneva Accords,
Viet Nam has in fact over the past eighteen years functioned as two states,
one in the North and one in the South. The de facto situation, even if it
could be maintained that it has not ripened into a de jure seperation of the
original state of Viet Nam, would establish that North Viet Nam is occupying
territory in South Viet Nam which does not belong to North Viet Nam since the
Geneva Accords have not been abrogated. The Convention then, is applicable
in the Viet Nam conflict as it is being conducted in South Viet Nam.
(3) Acts Directed towards Civilians by South Vietnamese and
American troops.
(a) South Vietnamese troops
The South Vietnamese are currently fighting in their own territory, and
have not at any time, occupied any territory in North Viet Nam. Conduct toward




(b) U. S. Troops
The United States forces participating in the Vietnamese conflict are
there pursuant to an obligation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
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Treaty, and at the invitation of the South Vietnamese government. It is
thus difficult to envision how the U.S. could be considered an Occupying Power
in South Viet Nam. Nonetheless the U.S. would seem to be complying with the
substantive provisions of the Civilian Convention in those areas in which it
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operates. The My Lai affair involving Lt. Calley and other military
17**
personnel who were tried by General Court-Martial , and other isolated
incidents such as Sgt. Bumgarner's general court-martial for killing three
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Vietnamese males while on a combat mission, are indicative of the concern
by both command and the general public that U.S. troops conduct themselves in
accordance with the rules of war and the Geneva Conventions. This attitude
is in stark contrast to that of the North Vietnamese, as revealed by the two
colonels who would not be punished if they killed civilians unnecessarily, but
would be severely punished if they failed to kill civilians in circumstances
in which their death could benefit the communists. Although there have
been violations of the Civilian Convention by U.S. military personnel, these
offenses were known, and the evidence could be obtained, have by and large
been followed by courts-martial proceedings against those responsible for the
offenses. It has been stated that the U. S. has probably done more to
acquaint its troops with the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure compliance with
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them, than has any other country.
d. Violations of the Civilian Conventions.
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that South Viet Nam could not
violate the Civilian Convention within its own boundaries. No charges of
violations of the Civilian Convention have thus been made against South
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Viet Nam. There have been "grave breaches" of the provisions of the Civilian
Convention by U. S. troops, (assuming it is applicable to U.S. troops in South
Viet Nam). However, these breaches have, where possible, been punished
1 7ft
pursuant to Article \k6 of the Convention, although the Convention itself
would not seem to apply to the (J. S. in South Viet Nam. The U. S. is thus
acting in accordance with the principles set down in the Convention, and would
appear to be discharging its international obligations.
The Viet Cong however have committed serious breaches of the Convention,
and though the Civilian Convention itself is not directly applicable to them,
the international rules enunciated therein are applicable. The Geneva
Conventions do not make adequate provision for this situation and there is
thus a need to draft provisions which would include such units, keeping in
mind that the purpose of such provisions is to protect non-combatant civilians.
The North Vietnamese on the other hand have committed at least some
breaches of the Civilian Convention by conscripting the civilian population
in occupied areas. The extent of their violations will not be known for some
time, but past experience indicates that serious breaches either have taken
place or are taking place.
B. Captured Combatants
In an armed conflict conducted on a large scale, prisoners are almost
invariably taken by both sides. These prisoners may vary in their relation
to the hostilities from individual terrorists whose targets have been non-
military objectives, to guerrillas who may or may not meet all the requirements
to be recognized as a legitimate combatant under the POW Convention, to
members of the regular armed forces of parties to the conflict. This section
will be primarily concerned with the treatment accorded personnel who are
members of the regular armed forces of parties to the conflict, although some
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reference will be made on occassion to personnel who come within the catagories
of terrorists and guerrillas.
1. Arab-Israeli Conflict
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the treatment accorded guerrillas and
regular armed forces by Israel is in marked contrast to the failure to observe
some portions of the Civilian Convention. The International Red Cross has
repeatedly reported that as regards Civilian and Military prisoners, both the
Arabs and Israelis would seem to be in compliance with the provisions of the
Civilian and PQW Conventions. The Red Cross has arranged for relatives to
visit Arab prisoners, has been permitted to talk in private with prisoners,
and has generally been permitted to conduct activity on behalf of the prisoners
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consistant with the Geneva Conventions. These activities by the Red Cross
would indicate that both sides are treating their prisoners in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the Convention, POW or Civilian, which is
applicable to them. If in fact there have been violations of the Geneva
Conventions respecting civilian and military prisoners, the reports of the
International Red Cross would seem to indicate that such violations are not
of such significance as to meet the requirements of this paper, and accordingly
will not be further considered in this context.
2. Vietnamese Conflict
The first American military man was captured by North Viet Nam in 1964.
Since that time, it has been established through North Viet Nam's propaganda
statements and through letters mailed by American prisoners, that North
1 R?
Viet Nam holds captive something in excess of 350 Americans. Additionally
it is believed that North Viet Nam now holds or has held many Americans not
included in that number. During the war, which has been conducted mostly
in South Viet Nam, more than 8,000 North Vietnamese and 30,000 National
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Liberation Front personnel have been captured, primarily by United States and
South Vietnamese forces. Those captives are being held as prisoners of war
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in South Vietnamese prisoner of war camps. The capture of personnel by
both sides has given rise to various claims and counter-claims by each side
as to what treatment has been and should be accorded these personnel. Of
import is the fact that North Viet Nam, the United States and South Viet Nam
are all signatories of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
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Prisoners of V/ar. The United States claims against North Viet Nam concern
alleged violations of the POW Convention by that country. In turn North Viet
Nam asserts various claims as to why the prisoners held in that country are
not entitled to prisoner of war status. Although neither North Viet Nam nor
the National Liberation Front has made any claims that their respective
1 87
personnel have been improperly treated following their capture, such claims
1 ftft
have been raised in the U.S. mass media, and by various groups within the
United States which either support the North Vietnamese military position
toward South Viet Nam, or are strongly opposed to the United States assisting
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South Viet Nam, or both.
a. Claims by the United States
The basic United States claim is that United States military personnel
captured by North Viet Nam are prisoners of war within the meaning of Article
k of the POW Convention. They are therefore entitled to treatment in accord-
1°0
ance with the provisions of that Convention. There follow numerous
assertions of specific violations of various articles of the POW Convention.
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1. Refusal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners.
1 92




H. No inspection of prisoners and prison facilities.
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6. Physical torture of prisoners.
5. Inadequate medical care.
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7. Refusal to release an official list of prisoners.
8. Severe restrictions on prisoners writing and receiving letters
and packages. '9°
While there are other charges of maltreatment of prisoners by North Viet Nam,
the foregoing are sufficient to reflect the nature of these claims, and the
general basis for the United States assertion that North Viet Nam is in
violation of the POW Convention.
b. Claims of North Viet Nam
North Viet Nam maintains that because the United States has not formally
declared war on North Viet Nam, its air attacks on North Viet Nam are "war
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crimes" and the personnel who participated in those attack are war criminals.
North Viet Nam further points out that its acceptance of the POW Convention
was with reservations as to Article 85 of the Convention. This reservation
states, ".
.
.(P)risoners of war prosecuted and convicted of war crimes, or for
crimes against humanity... shall not benefit from the present. Convention, as
specified in Article 85."
c. Claims of maltreatment of prisoners of war taken by the United States
and South Viet Nam.
No allegations of mis treatment of captured North Vietnamese military
personnel have ever been made by the North Vietnamese. However, as
previously noted numerous allegations have been made in the U.S. news media,
and by organizations who are either in accord with the goals of North Viet
Nam, or are opposed to the role of the United States in South Viet Nam. For
the most part these charges stem from means used by the United States and
South Vietnamese troops to interrogate prisoners for intelligence purposes.
These reports do not purport to distinguish between treatment of members of
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the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) operating as guerrilla units or
terrorists, and that accorded North Vietnamese soldiers. So far as these
claims are concerned, no distinction will be made between these two groups.
1. "There appears to be little doubt that at least well into 1966
South Vietnamese combat troops regularly mistreated captured 202
enemy personnel ... in order to obtain intelligence information..."
2. Larry Rottman. volunteer coordinator for veterans against the
war, stated before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments on April 20, 1971? that he personally
knew of the following types of mistreatment of prisoners of war




d. Shooting persons attempting to surrender,
3. One highly publicized incident in the U.S. mass media was the
confinement of prisoners of war in 'tiger cages' at Con Son.
h. Various individual incidents were described by Viet Nam veterans
in a paper compiled by the "National Veterans' Inquiry into War
Crimes": a year-end report. '
It would appear that mistreatment of North Vietnamese regular troops
and/or Viet Cong personnel has occured during the war in Viet Nam, and that
U.S. military personnel were directly or indirectly involved in such incidents,
d. Applicability of the POW Convention in Viet Nam
The nature of the conflict up until April, 1972, when North Viet Nam
openly sent its armies, not already located in South Viet Nam, across the
demarcation line between North and South Viet Nam, was one in which North Viet
Nam maintained that it was not at war and therefore the POW Convention was not
applicable. Even with the invasion, there is no indication that North Viet
Nam has changed its position toward U.S. Prisoners of War. The circumstances
of North Viet Nam's participation in the war prior to April 1972 was such that
inquiry into whether the POW Convention was applicable is necessary. If under
the circumstances, the Convention was not applicable, then those sanctions
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which might be applied to secure compliance with its provisions is a moot
question.
Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 19^9, Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War states in part, "...(T)he present convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them." There is irrefutable
empirical evidence that as between North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam and the
United States, there exists an "armed conflict", whether or not the Viet Cong
is considered a North Vietnamese agency for this purpose. All three partici-
pants have deployed large numbers of combat troops that regularly engage in
military operations with consequent lost of life, destruction of property,
and taking of prisoners. These three participants are all signatories of the
POW Convention. It is thus apparent that these three participants are bound
by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions if they are applicable in this
conflict. The National Liberation Front has not acceded to the POW Convention,
and has stated that since it did not participate in the four Geneva Conventions,
it was not bound by them. A consideration of whether guerrilla organizations
are required by the Geneva Conventions to treat prisoners of war in accordance
with the POW Convention is beyond the scope of this article. It is noted
however, that the substantive provisions of the conventions express general
rules of international law binding on all combatants regardless of any treaty.
(1) Necessity for Declaration of War
North Viet Nam's publicly announced reason for not complying with the
provisions of the POW Convention, is that there has been no "declaration of
208
war", hence the POW Convention is not applicable. There has not been a
formal declaration of war by the United States against North Viet Nam.

However, any view taken of the position of the United States in Viet Nam must
certainly concede that there is an"armed conflict", the second condition under
which the provisions of the POW Convention becomes applicable. There has
never been any contention that the U. S. Military personnel held by North Viet
Nam were operating other than within their respective military services and
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under the direction of the United States government. Regardless of how
U. S. participation is labeled, be it aggression or the collective self defense
of South Viet Nam, or by some other term, there is an "armed conflict"
involving combat forces from three signatories of the POW Convention. In this
respect, the POW Convention is applicable.
(2) Is the Armed Conflict of an International Character
Article 3 of the POW Convention provides' that:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties
...(p)ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
...those placed hos de combat by. . .detenti on. . .shal 1 . . .be treated
humanely. . ."
Although Article 3 prohibits "violence to life and person", "taking hostages",
"humiliating and degrading treatment", and provides for care for the sick and
wounded, it does not require inspection of detention facilities by an impartial
organization or neutral country, although "An impartial humanitarian body,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross may offer its services
21
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to the Parties to the conflict." If the Viet Nam conflict is properly
catagorized as not of an international character, then it would seem that
Article 3 not Article 2 of the POW Convention would be applicable. Although
there have been some violations even of the lesser standards established by
Article 3, the treatment of American prisoners held by North Viet Nam is not
grossly contrary to the explicit provisions of that Article. The limited
provisions of Article 3 merely establish minimum standards under the
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circumstances in which it is applicable. Implicit in its language however,
would seem to be a higher degree of "humane" treatment than has heretofore
been demonstrated by the North Vietnamese.
There has apparently never been an official declaration by the North
Vietnamese that the POW* Convention is not applicable because the conflict was
not an international one. It is appropriate however, to look to their conduct,
actions, and related statements, to determine just how North Viet Nam might
view the conflict for some purposes. The Geneva Accords of 195*+ did not
purport to divide Viet Nam into two countries. It did establish a buffer-zone
at the 17th parallel, and thus divided the country into two zones , with the
21 3intent of reunifying those two zones at a future date. J North Viet Nam's
Constitution which was revised in I960, asserts that Viet Nam is but one
nation. If that view is accepted, then the conflict would not seem to be
of an international character. In its dealings with the International Committee
of the Red Cross, North Viet Nam has stated, "...the captured American pilots
are treated humanely..." '^ and "...captured pilots are well treated. "216
Again when describing the treatment accorded the Americans held in North Viet
Nam, Minister Xuan Thuy, Chief of the Delegation of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, at the 100th plenary session of the Paris
Conference on Viet Nam on January 21, 1971* stated, "... (A) 1 though the
American pilots were captured in the act of committing crimes when bombing
the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, our government has treated them with
2 17leniency and humanity...." ' The terms "humanity", "well-treated" and
"humanely" may have been advisedly used by North Vietnam. It would seem that
a more convincing argument for refusing to treat captured Americans as
prisoners of war can be made on the basis that the conflict is not of an
international character, than can be made on the basis that the United States

has not declared war on North Viet Nam.
Regardless of what was intended, the partitioning of Viet Nam has
resulted in the creation of two international entities where before there was
only one. Each entity carries on its own trade, has its own government within
well defined territorial boundaries, has its own police, armies, diplomatic
relations and for all intents and purposes has all the characteristics of a
separate nation. Under these circumstances, an armed conflict between North
and South Viet Nam alone should be of an international character. With the
addition of American, Australian, New Zealand, Phillippine, Thialand and South
Korean combat troops, the conflict becomes pecularily international in fact.
There is precedent for applying the PQW Convention to a situation such as that
which exists in Viet Nam. The intervention in the conflict involving North
and South Korea, although carried out under the auspices of the United Nations,
was quite similar to that in Viet Nam. In that conflict the Communist forces
insisted that the provisions of the PQW Convention were applicable, even
2 1 ft
though they did not themselves comply with those provisions. Although one
party to a conflict cannot be prevented from denying the conflict's inter-
national character, that party cannot for international purposes, in the face
of empirical evidence to the contrary, so characterize a conflict merely
because such characterization would best serve its ends.
It follows that Article 2 of the PQW Convention is applicable, and that
the American and North Vietnamese captives are prisoners of war.
e. Do the substantiated claims violate the PQW Convention.
(1) Claims concerning prisoners taken by the United States and South
Viet Nam
Essentially all of the claims of mistreatment of prisoners by U.S. and
21 9
South Vietnamese troops involve various means of torture to obtain information.

<*7
Another claim is the occassional refusal of troops in the field to take
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prisoners, the election being to kill them. Each of these allegations
are clearly violations of the POW Convention.
An additional highly publicized claim was the confinement of prisoners
of war in the "Tiger Cages*' at Con Son. This incident was publicized by both
22
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the mass news media and other writers. If, in fact, prisoners of war had
been confined in "windowless pits" under the circumstances indicated, it would
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clearly be a violation of the Geneva Convention. However, subsequent
investigation has disclosed that the persons confined in the "Tiger Cages" at
Con Son were not prisoners of war. Indeed the "Tiger Cages" themselves were
not "pits" as advertised, but rather two story buildings having bars in place
of a ceiling. Although there were 29 prisoners of war at Con Son, none of
them were in "tiger cages" and each had been tried and convicted of felonies
committed in the ordinary prison camps, and subsequently transferred to Con
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Son. J In this regard, South Viet Nam was not in violation of the PQW
Convention.
(2) Claims Concerning prisoners taken by North Viet Nam
From the outset of direct involvement by the United States in the Viet
Nam war, the North Vietnamese have made it clear that they would not apply the
22li
provisions of the POW Convention to captured Americans. The information
which has come to light concerning the actual treatment of these personnel,
as well as the refusal to put into effect the more formal provisions providing
for impartial inspection of the facilities and prisoners, ^ merely emphasize
the stated policy. A partial list of the more pertinent actions and the




Refusal to exchange sick and
wounded prisoners Article 109
Prisoners paraded before the
General population Article 13
Food inadequate in quantity and
quality Article 26
Inadequate medical care Article 30
Physical torture Articles 13 and 130
Refusal to provide an official
list of prisoners Article 122
Severe and vacillating restrictions
on writing letters Article 71
(3) Effect of North Viet Nam's reservations to the POW Convention
North Viet Nam's accession to the POW Convention was made with several
reservations. One of these reservations was to Article 85 which provides
that "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for
acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits
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of the present convention." North Viet Nam has declared (as have essentially
all of the communist bloc nations) that "prisoners of war prosecuted and
convicted for war crimes or for crimes against humani ty. . .shal 1 not benefit
from the. ..Convention. . ." Although, North Viet Nam claims that the American
prisoners are war criminals, none have been tried and convicted. It is not
necessary to delve into whether the bombing of North Viet Nam constitutes a
war crime attributable to each participating pilot and air crewman, or to
question whether such reservation is legal from an international law viewpoint.
It should be sufficient that the reservation itself specifies that each
prisoner of war be tried and convicted of a war crime to no longer be entitled
to the protection of the Convention. As noted earlier in this discussion,
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essentially all of the communist bloc countries inserted an exception to
Article 85. There was little difference in their wording, and it is apparent
that each exception contemplates the same effect as do the exceptions taken
by each of the other communist countries. In response to an inquiry from the
Swiss Government on this matter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
forwarded a note which, in explanation of the exception to Article 85, stated
in part, "...prisoners of war who, under the Law of the USSR, have been
convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity must be subject to the
conditions obtaining in the USSR for all other persons undergoing punishment
e . 229in execution of judgments by the courts." It is thus clear that the
reservation itself does not become applicable until after a trial and conviction.
f. Violations of the POW Convention
It is conceded that the South Vietnamese army has violated the provisions
of the POW Convention, at least in respect to Viet Cong guerrillas and
terrorists, and that if the United States troops did not themselves violate
the provisions of the convention, there was at least some complicity in the
South Vietnamese violations involving prisoners taken by the U.S. and turned
over to South Viet Nam. As to prisoners taken by the South Vietnamese, however,
the United States has no legal obligation to assure that South Viet Nam
complies with the convention. 230 In any event, upon discovery that violations
of the POW Convention were taking place, particularly by South Vietnamese
troops, the United States appears to have corrected the situation so that
violations by South Vietnamese and United States troops are minimized. Most
violations of the convention were committed by South Vietnamese in the field
after the American troops turned captives over to South Vietnamese troops.
These violations were largely stopped by the American's refusing to turn




directly to the POW camps. There are doubtless still isolated instances
of violations of the PQW Convention by allied troops, but such conduct has
been reduced to a bare minimum and certainly is not part of an official
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policy by the United States.
By contrast, North Viet Nam which has long been in violation of the POW
Convention, continues to do so as a matter of official policy.
II. Problems peculiar to current Conflict Arenas
It should come as no great shock that most wars over the past few years
have not been fought under such conditions as to permit the employment of the
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classic principles espoused by General von Clauswitz. The so-called wars
of national liberation do not employ the classic concepts of infantry and
calvary maneuvering across open fields to the beat of drums at high noon on a
cloudless spring day. With the introduction of large scale guerrilla and
terrorist activity as well as the concept of "total war" involving entire
populations, has come a blurring of many traditional concepts within the
conflict arena. Questions which currently confront the military commander
and established governments are such matters as; Whore are the combat zones?
How can you distinguish combatants from non-combatants? What are legal and
what are illegal means of conducting warfare? Who is responsible, morally
and legally, for injury to non-combatant civilians? Each of these problems
could in themselves be the subject of a comprehensive dissertation. It is
beyond the scope of this article to even fully define the problems involved
in the foregoing questions. They will however, be discussed in a general
manner to illustrate the type of contemporary settings to which the POW and
Civilian Conventions must be adapted.
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A. Where is the Combat Zone?
One of the more difficult problems confronting those officials who must
counter guerrilla activity, is what areas constitute the combat zones. This
same question is posed in modern day conventional warfare because of the
dependence of troops in the field on the industrial capacity of their respec-
tive states, or the industrial capacity of other states which supply arms to
them. The question is further complicated when guerrillas are permitted to.
operate out of states adjoining the state under attack, as was the case in the
Arab-Israeli conflict for several years. Since this article will consider
these problems in only a cursory manner, they may be considered under two
headings; Those states directly involved in the conflict, and those states
indirectly involved in the conflict.
1. States directly involved in the Conflict.
Where two or more states are directly involved in conventional warfare,
the traditional concept of the combat area being the field or area in which
the contesting armies meet, would at first seem plausible. However the
realities of modern day conventional warfare employing large armies which
require immense quantities of war materials, involves essentially the entire
economy in the war effort. As illustrated in World War II by the German
air attacks on industry in England and other allied states, and the attacks
by the United States and its allies on the industrial base of Germany, a new
dimension has been added to what may legitimately be called the battle arena.
That dimension includes the industrial and economic base. This dimension was
not recognized simply because in a given war the respective states attacked
their enemies' industry, but rather because the military necessity for such
attacks was recognized and accepted by both sides. It may thus be surmised
that essentially the entire territory of a state actively engaged in con-
ventional warfare may be described as a conflict arena.
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A more difficult problem confronts a state when neighboring states permit
guerrillas to conduct military or terrorist attacks from their territory, with
or without the active assistance of the harboring states. In this situation
the harboring state may be professing neutrality while actively working with
the guerrillas, or the neighboring state may truely be unable from a military
standpoint, to prevent the guerrillas from using its territory as a base of
operations. Certainly in the instance where the harboring state assists the
guerrillas, or fails to take any meaningful action to halt the activity, it
is in violation of Article h of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Rights and
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Duties of Neutral Powers. In either instance, whether the harboring state
is either unwilling or unable to stop the attacks originating in its territory,
the state against which the attacks are being' launched would seem to be
entitled to attack the guerrillas at their home base, thus spreading the
active conflict arena from its own into neighbors boundaries. This has long
been the situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The same principle would
seem to be applicable in Laos and Thailand where the United States daily
launches air attacks against North Viet Nam, and in fact the principle has
been applied by both South Viet Nam and the United States in conducting
operations against North Vietnamese supply and regrouping centers in Cambodia
and Laos. Justification for enlarging the conflict arena to include a portion
of the territory of a supposedly neutral state (disregarding the risk of open
warfare with that state) may be justified by the principle that "Belligerents
may not use neutral territory as a base for military expeditions or military
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enterprises against the enemy." " Where the neutral state either cannot or
will not stop the activity, it is only reasonable that the state under attack
by the guerrillas should be entitled to take appropriate action.
A third difficulty confronting a state within whose boundaries guerrilla
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activity is being conducted, is determining where the guerrillas are located.
This problem is greatly complicated because of the new standard guerrilla
23R
tactic of dressing as does the population in a given area. JO The guerrilla
activity becomes even more difficult to isolate where guerrillas murder the
local populace who might assist the government in locating guerrillas, as in
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South Viet Nam, and seek to alienate the population from the legally
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constituted government through terror tactics. The difficulty here is
determining which portion of a state's own territory is beginning to fall, or
has fallen under enemy control. When the guerrillas cannot be isolated, the
entire territory, or a large portion of it thus becomes a conflict arena.
This of course is a standard tactic, and one of the primary goals of guerrilla
organizations.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that war in the contemporary
world has greatly broadened the areas which may properly be considered as
conflict arenas. With this boradening of the arena, more civilians, not
directly engaged in the fighting in the sense that they carry a gun, are at
the focal point of pitched battles, air attacks, terrorist activities, and
advancing armies. Since there appears to be little chance of narrowing the
combat arena in the forseeable future, the need for some means of enforcing
the Civilian Convention and the rules of war becomes more acute.
2. States not directly involved in the conflict.
States not actively involved in hostilities in the sense that attacks are
being launched from within their borders, may nevertheless become involved to
one degree or another through other means. For instance supplies may be
transported across its territory or even directly provided to a belligerent.
Since a neutral state is not obliged to intervene to stop such shipments of
2^2
supplies, these circumstances could enlarge the conflict arena as the
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state against which the supplies are being used seeks to halt their flow.
Another circumstance in which a state may become indirectly involved,
is when members of a guerrilla organization attempt to extort funds through
aircraft hijacking, robbery or other criminal activity. These kinds of
activity however would not ordinarily tend to expand the geographical area of
conflict as such and therefore will not be further considered.
B. Distinguishing Combatants from Non-Combatants.
1. Members of Regular Military Units
Members of regular military units are in almost all circumstances
recognizable as such. Such recognition is important since under the POW
Convention, members of regular armed forces, and guerrillas who meet the four
requirements of (1) being commanded by a person responsible for his sub-
ordinates, (2) wearing a fixed distinctive sign, (3) openly carrying arms,
and (4) conducting operations in accordance with the laws of war, are entitled
to be treated as pri soners-of-war under the POW Convention. In addition
to determining who is entitled to treatment as prisoners-of-war , these
requirements also serve to protect the civilian population from being mistaken
for enemy troops. Although regular military units do not wear full dress
uniform on the field, some sort of uniform, including camoflaged uniforms with
accompanying arms serves to distinguish regular units from the civilian
population.
2. Guerri 1 las
It is necessary to distinguish guerrillas from civilians and from
terrorists for different reasons. The distinction from terrorists becomes
necessary after capture to determine whether the individual is to be treated
as a common criminal under the municipal criminal code, or is to be accorded
treatment as a prisoner-of-war. The distinction from civilian non-combatants
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is necessary before capture, in order to determine if the individual is a
combatant, subject to attack, or a civilian or group of civilian non-combatants
immune from direct attack.
a. Distinguished from terrorists.
During the period since World War II, there has been a general blurring
of the distinction between terrorist activity and activity by units which can
legitimately be called guerrillas. This blurring has resulted in large measure
from the same units conducting both classic guerrilla activity, and acts which
can only be described as terrorist actions, as part of a unified strategy.
In considerable measure, the practice of wearing a distinctive sign and
carrying arms openly seems to be currently noted more by its abuse than
compliance. Is there another means of distinguishing terrorists from
guerrillas? It would seem that a logical means is to look to the object of
the attack. Terrorists tend to use force indiscriminately against both the
civilian community and military objects. Guerrillas on the other hand tend
to think in terms of military objectives and their attacks are directed toward
such objectives. As a practical matter, terrorist activity and guerrilla
activity tend to blend into one another, especially in the early stages of
conflict when efforts are being made to organize guerrilla bands. At this
stage a lone terrorist may be used to create a sensational spectacle and show
2*46
of force, perhaps through detonating explosives in public areas. It is
suggested that where a government must decide whether to accord prisoner-of-
war status to a captured irregular belligerent, a rule of thumb which may be
used to determine whether the individual is a guerrilla or terrorist, is to
look to the object of attack. This is not however, meant to suggest that the
requirements of legitimate belligerents, as specified in the POW Convention,
be ignored or even lessened, but rather to point out that in practice some
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governments have been reasonably lenient in granting such status to prisoners
who did not meet the requirements of the Convention, and that the objects
of attack in those instances afford a reasonable alternate guideline.
b. Distinguishing Guerrillas from Civilian Non-Combatants
It is necessary to distinguish guerrillas from terrorists in order to
determine whether the individuals involved should be accorded treatment as
prisoners-of-war . That need is therefore directed toward the protection of
legitimate belligerents. There is a more immediate and urgent reason for
distinguishing guerrillas from civilian non-combatants. This need arises in
combat arenas when government forces are confronted with guerrilla activity.
From a guerrilla's point of view, compliance with the four requirements
especially those requiring that he wear a distinctive sign and carry arms
openly, destroys some of his effectiveness and makes him more likely to be
discovered and attacked. These requirements however were not designed to even
the odds in a game, or give the government a little edge it would not otherwise
have. They were intended to., and where observed, do in fact afford some
minimal protection to the civilian non-combatant population. The primary
purpose of the requirements is to distinguish guerrillas from the civilian
population and thus reduce the instances in which civilians are taken under
f . ... 248fire as guerri lias.
In the 1971 Conference of Government experts on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
most of the experts advocated abandoning the necessity for guerrillas to wear
a fixed distinctive sign. The requirement suggested by some representatives
as a substitute was that the combatants openly carry on the struggle, meaning
that they not try to hide their combatant status. This could be d one either
2 ^0by carrying arms openly or by wearing a distinctive sign. ' In addition to
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proposals to lessen the requirements for legitimate guerrilla combatants,
there are also proposals for more lenient treatment of terrorists, inspired
by professed sympathies for "liberation" movements. ' This proposed
broadening of the spectrum of protected persons qualifying as guerrillas on
the one hand, and granting more lenient treatment to terrorists on the other,
is likely inspired by the Communist attitude toward guerrillas engaged in
activity against a non-communist government, and the distinction between so-
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called "just" and "unjust" wars, as defined in communist idealogy. This
factor is one which will require consideration in any proposed means to enforce
the present POW and Civilian Conventions. Until the ground rules for legi-
timate combatants are enforced, the persons most directly affected, are not
the combatants, but rather non-combatant civilians. Soldiers are human beings
and have no more desire to be killed than does anyone else. Nor are the
objective concepts of the Geneva Conventions likely to have much relevance to
his actions when he is being subjected to hostile fire from individuals he
253
cannot distinguish from the local population. He is even less likely to
be impressed with the humanitarian goals of the conventions, when empirical
evidence convinces him that part of the civilian population becomes night-
25*+
time guerrillas and terrorists. He thus becomes less inclined to await
positive identification of guerrillas when confronted with unknown persons in
civilian dress, and is more likely to fire at civilians who are in fact non-
combatants. Even this however serves to further the purpose of guerrillas,
because it tends to alienate the civilian population from the government, and
thus either enlist their direct or tacit support for the guerrillas. The
government troops on the other hand are confronted with a situation in which
persons involved in guerrilla movements are urged to wear civilian clothing
and carry concealed arms so as to be indistinguishable from the civilian
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population, " while the government troops are publicly faulted for any error
in mistaking civilians for guerrillas, and placed in mortal personal danger
if they mistake guerrillas for civilians. The government troops reaction is
likely to be, if he must err, to err on the side which places him in less
immediate physical danger.
It should be concluded that the four requirements of Article k of the POW
256
Convention, are necessary to protect the civilian population. Further
relaxation of these rules, while appearing to be humane in the treatment
accorded guerrillas and terrorists, can only result in increased casualties
among non-combatant civilians, and thus in the long haul prove to be more
257inhumane. If there must be harsh consequences to human beings involved
in a conflict, the consequences should fall on those who are combatants, and
not on those individuals among whom the conflict has raged against their
wishes. It is partly to enforce the current rules, designed to accomplish
this purpose, that sanctions are needed.
C. Distinguishing legal from illegal means of warfare.
In general the distinction of legal from illegal combat activity may be
discussed under three headings; legal combatants, means of attack, and objects
of attack The first of these three has been discussed in the preceeding
paragraphs. The problems discussed in the following paragraphs therefore
deal with the latter two matters.
1 . Means of attack.
The 1907 Hague convention governing Land Warfare provides that "The right
258
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." It
was repeatedly declared at the Nuremberg trials fol 1 owing World War II , that
the principles stated in the Hague Conventions were recognized by all civilized
nations, and as such were declatory of the customary laws of war. -^ It
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follows then that war crimes are violations of international law, and there-
260
fore punishable regardless of whether there is any municipal law violation.
Having established that individuals who are responsible for violations
of the laws of war are subject to punishment by the world community, it is
then interesting to note that many of the rules governing the types of force
which may be used, as specified by treaty, are so general that they are no
longer applicable or may technically be avoided in the contemporary world.
In the last analysis, it may be concluded that the principles are what will
have to govern, rather than set rules prohibiting particular weapons. The
principles involved which have been stated as constituting the "...'basic
?6l
principles of the laws of war'..." are "military necessity, humanity and
chivalry...", although it is offered that chivalry has for the greater
part faded from the scene. Military necessity allows belligerents to use
only such means and degree' of force as is absolutely required to win, with
263
the least loss of time, life, and property. Humanity prohibits the use of
264force not necessary for the purpose of the war, while chivalry forbids
resort to "dishonorable (treacherous) means." It has been asserted that
Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions which states that "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention
* n
,
a^ circumstances ." (emphasis added), has generally proscribed the rule of
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military necessity. It is submitted that such rationale if followed would
lead to further disregard of the Conventions. When a state is confronted
with circumstances on which its very existence may turn, the recognized rule
of 'military necessity 1 will prevail over humane considerations. It is thus
better to have imperfect rules which can in the real world be followed, than
267




It has been stated that total destruction can rarely be justified. So
far as this relates to means of attack which will unnecessarily kill civilians,
this assertion would seem to be correct. Following this rationale it has been
urged on numerous occassions that the use of nuclear weapons is therefor
unlawful. " The most reasoned objection to such weapons would seem to be
that because of the magnitude of their power, there can be no selectivity
270
between military and non-military objectives. It would seem however, that
when a balancing of the cost in human lives and property, would disclose that
there will ultimately be less loss if the weapons are used than if not used,
as was the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan in World War II, then
the failure to use such weapons, even with the resulting devastation in a
given area, would violate the rules requiring use of minimum force and loss
of life to gain the objective. The same rationale would seem to apply to
chemical warfare. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of Gas
was prepared in a time before effective non-lethal gases were perfected. The
United States however is using tear and nausea gas in Viet Nam against entren-
ched North Vietnamese troops, and the North Vietnamese have also used tear
271gas against the South Vietnamese. ' The United States rationale for using
these gases is that it is possible to "capture enemy soldiers unharmed, and
(is) particularly useful in reducing civilian casualties when the enemy has
272infiltrated into population centers..." An analysis of the use of gas,
which may technically violate the provisions of the Gas Protocol of 1925,
affirms that treaties which are not continually revised to keep pace with
technological developments soon lose their effectiveness, and indeed may
become counter-productive. The objective of the Gas Protocol following
World War I, was to reduce unnecessary casualties from a weapon causing great
suffering before death, and permanent damage in many cases when it did not ki U.
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Yet, the new incapacitating gases such as tear gas and nausea gases do not
cause permanent injury and substantially reduce civilian as well as military
casualties and property damage well below that which would be incurred if
conventional weapons were used. From the viewpoint of minimal destruction of
human values, the use of gases would seem to be justified.
It is suggested that within the relatively loose framework bounded on
the one side by military necessity and on the other by humane considerations,
those weapons which are most effective in accomplishing the objective, with
minimal loss of human values should be permissible. It is the human factor
which was the purpose of the rules at the outset ,and it is that factor which
should determine the legality of weapons as new technology emerges in the
weapons field.
2. Objects of Attack
"It is evident that acts of terrorism directed against enemy
civilian objectives unquestionably represent infractions of
the laws of war, regardless of who may be their authors
(Whether or not they are legal combatants). "273
The foregoing quotation would seem to summarize the laws of war respecting
objects lawfully subject to attack. The use of large scale bombing raids,
artillary barrages, and even attacks by individual infantrymen where civilian
objectives are hit, can, if not sufficiently related to a genuine military
objective be construed as terrorism, or war crimes. It is thus pointed out
that such offenses may be committed by regular as well as guerrilla units.
However, regardless of whether there are regular or guerrilla units involved,
the act constitutes a violation of the laws of war. and again it is the
civilians who are trapped with no effective remedy.

62
D. Responsibility for injury to Civilian Non-Combatants.
When the rules of war, regarding lawful combatants, lawful means of attack,
or lawful objects of attack, &re not followed, the destruction of human life
as well as property is increased beyond that which should be tolerated even
in a combat situation. V/hen there is indiscriminate murder of civilians
such as that committed by U. S. troops at My Lai , '^ or those perpetrated by
the Viet Cong at Hue, '-> there is no difficulty in assessing responsibility
for the crimes. However, when military objectives are deliberately located
amidst the non-combatant civilian population, resulting in attacks on the
military objective which incidently inflict casualties on non-combatant
civilian personel 1 or property, a different problem is posed. It may be con-
ceded that:
"There is ... no reason to differentiate between indiscriminate 'terrorism'
by guerrilleros against the population and the equally indiscriminate
attacks perpetrated by the air force, artillery or infantry of the
regular forces."^?"
In tne cost of human lives, and property, there is no distinction between who
fired the shells, or whether the bomb was dropped by a plane or set by a
terrorist. Israel recently resumed attacks on villages suspected of being
277bases for Palestinian guerrillas. The attacks, resulting in several civilian
casualties were apparently in reprisal for attacks by the Palestinian
guerrillas against Israeli civilian housing areas. This incident serves to
put in perspective the question of responsibility. For instance, when con-
sidering the action of the guerrillas in initially attacking the Israeli
housing areas, should the circumstances of how Israel obtained those areas be
considered, or should only the fact that the guerrilla attacks were against
a civilian objective be weighed? Does it matter that the guerrillas do not
have the sophisticated military equipment required to launch attacks against
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precise targets? It would seem that the Palestinian guerrillas must lose on
both points. If the purpose of the Rules of War are to conserve human resources
and protect non-combatant civilians, attacks on civilian objectives, unrelated
?7ft
to an immediate military objective cannot be accepted. The method by which
Israel obtained the areas on which the guerrilla attacks were launched is
immaterial if the sole objective of the guerrilla attack is to create terror.
It is accepted as customary international law that individuals not a part of
the armed forces cannot be the objects of attack, where such attack is not
279
incidental to military operations. However, if the Israeli attack is in
reprisal for a violation of the rules of War, it is not illegal even where
280
directed against the civilian population. This rule would seem to apply
to the recent attacks by Israel, especially if the Guerrillas involved are
likely to reside in the villages attacked.
Although Article 28 of the Civilian Convention stating "The presence of
a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations," applies only to occupied areas, the principle
stated therein would seem to have universal application. The objective is to
prohibit the deliberate use of civilians as a shield for legitimate military
targets. The extremely effective German anti-aircraft defense in World War II„
plus the location of the war industries in heavily populated areas made target
area bombing necessary in that war. With this tactic, the planes simply
dropped their bombs in the area the military objective was known to be located.
The justification for this tactic was that the Germans had taken measures
i.e., anti-aircraft defenses, which effectively concealed the targets.
Doubtless the same rationale can be applied to many of the Palestinian
Guerrilla's attacks on Israel, and the Viet Cong attacks on South Viet Nam.
The question to be raised in these rocket attacks however, is what chance is
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there of successfully hitting the military target? If with the weapons
available there is no reasonable expectation of success, as would seem to be
283
the case, then the attacks cannot be justified.
Guerrillas present another problem. In present day guerrilla warfare,
the guerrillas frequently dress, and are urged by their leaders to dress, as
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does the civilian populace. They then move among the civilian population,
and attack both civilian and military targets from that cover. Such conduct
would seem to violate the principle enunciated by Article 28 of the Civilian
Convention, even though that Article might not be directly applicable.
It may be concluded that where guerrillas attempt to conceal themselves
among the civilian populace, or where lawfully (or unlawfully for that matter)
constituted governments, attempt to conceal military objectives among the
civilian populace, it is the attempt to use the civilian population as cover,
rather than the attack on the concealed military objective, which is responsible
for civilian casualties and damage to civilian property done in the attack.
The problems discussed in this section (II A through D above) illustrate
the type of problem which must be resolved before it is possible to determine
against whom sanctions should be taken, and a procedure for making these
determinations must thus be encompassed in any sanctioning process. Common
to all the problems presented and the circumstances in which they appear, is
the position of the civilian populace trapped in the combat arena, with no
recourse but to wait out the hostilities and hope for the best.
III. Ineffectiveness of POW and Civilian Geneva Conventions in Many
Contemporary circumstances
A. Demonstrated Ineffectiveness
Despite the broad protection afforded non-combatants by the Civilian
Convention, it has been demonstrated elsewhere in this article that when
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there are armed hostilities in the contemporary world, the rights of civilians
are given secondary importance to the respective interests of the belligerents.
Consequently, in Israel, Arabs have been expelled from occupied territory so
that Israel may expropriate the real property for Israelis, while in Viet Nam
there has been maiming, murder, and abuse of civilians in an effort to
establish a communist base of power in South Viet Nam. Additionally, there
has been disregard of the POW Convention by the North Vietnamese, and to a
lesser degree by the South Vietnamese. Nor is such disregard for regulations
concerning pri soners-of-war and civilians, a recent development. During the
second World War, Russia refused to comply with the Convention as it concerned
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German prisoners, and during the Korean War the North Korean and Chinese
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Communist refused to apply the POW Convention^
While it is not meant to imply that the provisions of the POW and Civilian
Conventions are never followed, it is apparent that the provisions are
violated far more often than would be the case if belligerents were making a
bona fide effort to comply with their international obligations in this respect,
B. Why do State Signatories of the POW and Civilian Geneva Conventions
not comply with its provisions?
Article 129 of the POW Convention and Article 1^6 of the Civilian Con-
vention imposes an obligation upon contracting states to enact legislation
for the punishment of "grave breaches" as defined in the Conventions. Such
acts as willful killing, torture and inhuman treatment, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer of protected persons, and extensive destruction or appropriation of
property not justified by military necessity, are among the acts designated
288
as "grave breaches" in the POW and Civilian Conventions. Since there is
289
no international criminal court to try war criminals, it is apparent that
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a belligerent has a duty under Articles 129 and 1^6 of the POW and Civilian
Conventions, respectively, to punish members of its armed forces who commit
290
"grave breaches" of the Conventions. ? The United States fulfills this
obligation by making the Commanding Officer of units responsible for illigi-
timate acts committed by his subordinates, when the acts are by his order,
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authorization or acquescence. Such criminal responsibility of the Commanding
Officer does not relieve the actual perpetrator of the offense from his
personal responsibility for his actions. It has been repeatedly demonstrated
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that in fact, the United States enforces these rules. On the other hand,
it is apparent that a number of other states do not. The question is then
raised, why not?
1. Russia's refusal to apply the POW Convention in World War II.
As noted earlier in this article, Russia refused to apply the Geneva
Convention to German prisoners-of-war in World War II. The Russian position
was that "...any soldier who fell into enemy hands was ipso facto a traitor
and deserved no protection from his government..." "* This position was
maintained throughout the war despite its contribution to the death of untold
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thousands of Russian prisoners-of-war held by the Germans. Since Germany
did in general comply with the POW Convention respecting American prisoners-
of-war, it would appear that Germany applied the Convention on a reciprocal
basis. Why would Russia not apply the Convention? The answer would seem to
be that by inviting Germany to mistreat the Russians it captured, Russia
discouraged its own soldiers from surrendering. This objective of preserving
its armies in the field, was given priority over the lives of those Russian
soldiers who had been captured and could thus no longer assist in the conflict.
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2. North Viet Nam's refusal to apply the POW Convention to American
Pri soners-of-War
.
In the Vietnamese conflict, North Viet Nam has maintained that since war
has not been declared, the POW Convention is not applicable. It has therefore
refused to comply with the POW Conventi on. 2 95 For a country that executed
some fifty thousand of its own citizens, at times on an almost indiscriminate
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basis, in the implementation of a land reform program, the violation of the
POW Convention in respect to a few hundred American prisoners of war is indeed
a minor affair, provided there is some objective to be gained.
When it is considered that there would likely be little if any need to
increase men and materials, and indeed there might be a decrease in both, to
accord American pr isoners-of-war the rights required by the POW Convention,
then it becomes apparent that North Viet Nam has some definite purpose in its
present course of action. Several possible objectives are present.
The North Vietnamese Constitution provides severe penalties for anyone
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who opposes the policies of North Viet Nam toward South Viet Nam. ' After
years of sending its young men into the South to fight, and being on a wartime
footing at home, it is not unreasonable to expect some disillusionment with
298
the war by the North Vietnamese. V/hat better object lesson to North Viet
Nam's own subjects than the harsh treatment of Americans who have been captured
while supporting South Viet Nam. The Americans thus provide an example with-
out alienating the family and friends of North Vietnamese Nationals who might
otherwise be punished.
The prolonged confinement of Americans in substandard conditions in North
Viet Nam, creates an emotional element in the United States which can unite
numerous groups with diverse interests in demanding that whatever steps
necessary, including withdrawal from South Viet Nam, be taken to obtain their
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release. The North Vietnamese are aware of this and are doubtless counting on
internal political pressure to curtail, and eventually terminate the United
299
States' active support for South Viet Nam. This is the only rational
construction that can be attributed to the statement of the North Vietnamese
delegation in Paris which instructed the wives of American captured and
missing in action to "go back to the United States and participate in some of
the anti-war demonstrations, and some of the activities that would bring
pressure on the administration."
If one accepts as a premise that North Viet Nam hopes to accomplish its
military objective against the United States through internal political
pressure,™' then the probable adverse effects the years of mistreatment of
American prisoners if publicly disclosed would have on the North Vietnamese
influence within certain anti-war groups in the United States cannot be
underestimated.
Part IV of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War provides for repatriation of prisoners of war following the cessation
302
of active hostilities. If it can successfully be maintained that the
captured Americans are not prisoners of war, the Geneva Convention obligation
for immediate repatriation on the cessation of hostilities is not applicable.
This would seem to be consistant with the position of the North Vietnamese
government that ",..(l)t (the U.S.) should announce the total withdrawal from
South Viet Nam of U.S. troops. ..by June 30, 1971. ..so that discussion may
immediately begin on the question of releasing captured military men, including
303American pilots, captured while bombing the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam."
The North Vietnamese have never really altered that position. If it was
intended to release Americans immediately upon withdrawal of the United States
forces, there would appear to be little to discuss once these forces were
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withdrawn. However, the phrasing used by North Viet Nam would seem to indicate
some important discussion following that event. It could indicate that North
Viet Nam has further plans to manipulate the prisoners held in North Viet Nam
in order to compel compensation for damage done by the United States bombing
that country.
It may be surmized that the North Vietnamese probably have at least four
objectives in their consistant position that the POW Convention is not
applicable in the Viet Nam conflict: (1) An example to the North Vietnamese
people, (2) To exert internal political pressure on the United States to
terminate support for South Viet Nam, (3) To not alienate its pro-North
Vietnamese support in the United States by displaying to the United States
the effect of its mistreatment of American pri soners-of-war , and (4) The use
of the American prisoners of war as hostages to extort payment for bombing
damage to North Vietnam.
3. Israel's disregard of the Civilian Convention in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict.
Israel has consistantly violated several provisions of the Civilian Con-
vention relating to the deportation of civilians, the destruction of their
homes, and the expropriation of their property. Israel continues to violate
the Civilian Convention by settling Israeli nationals on the property confis-
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cated. Its assertion that the Gaza Strip will never be seperated from
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Israel, combined with the apparent permanent settlement of Israeli nationals
in territory occupied in 1 9^+8 and 19&7, wake it clear that Israel's goal is to
acquire by conquest as much territory as possible. To do this, in accordance
with the Zionist philosophy of making an exclusive Jewish state, it is
necessary to exclude all but Jews from the borders of territory as it is
conquered. So far as the Palestinian refugees are concerned, Israel apparently
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considers them as having been permanently removed from its boundaries and
cast onto the neighboring states, and gives no consideration to their repatri-
ation in their homeland.
"Repartriation would mean that hundreds of thousands of people
would be introduced into a state whose existence they oppose,
whose flag they despise and whose destruction they are resolved
to seek. The refugees are all Arabs; and the countries in which
they find themselves are Arab countries. Yet the advocates of
repatriation contend that these Arab refugees be settled in a
non-Arab country..."-'
The Israelis consider the permanent displacement of Arabs from what was
originally Palestine an accomplished fact. The objective of Israel then has
been to rid Palestine of Arabs, and further the Zionist concept of an exclu-
sively Jewish state.
k. State interest predominates over the' POW and Civilian Conventions.
The foregoing three examples illustrate three cases in which national
objectives are in conflict with the humanitarian principles expressed in the
POW and Civilian Conventions. During World War II, Russia felt the need to
discourage its soldiers from surrendering. North Viet Nam has concluded that
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the American prisoners of war it holds are a potent bargaining chip, perhaps
enough to gain its military objectives against the United States and to demand
substantial aid in rebuilding areas damaged by U.S. bombs, Israel set forth
on a program of establishing a state populated solely by Jews, and therefore
required extensive land on which to settle them as they immigrated to Israel.
Since the land was owned primarily by Arabs, it was necessary to deport them
and seize their property.
It is evident that when the predominant objectives of a state are in
conflict with the human values expressed in the POW and Civilian Conventions,
the national objectives are given priority.
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C. Why do non-state entities not comply with the POW and Civilian
Geneva Conventions.
In the kind of warfare which has prevailed during the past twenty years,
terrorist tactics have been used by guerrillas against civilians with no
effort to comply with the Civilian Convention. Some typical tactics and the
purpose of those tactics are detailed in Stephen T. Hosmer's Exerpts from
308
'
Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future. As in the case
of states which do not observe the provisions of the Conventions, the guerrilla
or terrorist objectives are considered by the individuals involved to out-
weigh the humanitarian values explicitly set forth in the Conventions. There
is however, a problem in attempting to bind guerrilla or terrorist bands to
the provisions of the POW and Civilian Conventions. As non-state entities,
they have not signed the Conventions, and indeed do not possess the inter-
national personality required to sign an international treaty. How then are
they bound by its provisions?
It has been suggested that there are two theories by which non-state
entities are bound by the substantive provisions of the POW and Civilian
Conventions. They may be considered as being bound as a result of the
accession of the legitimate government to the Conventions, that accession
309being binding of all the states subjects. Or they may be considered as
being bound to follow the substantive provisions of the Conventions because
they are declaratory of customary international law which is universal in its
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application. Since reliance on the first grounds would seem to exempt from
the obligation to comply with the substantive provisions of the Conventions,
all of those individuals who are not nationals of any state, as well as those
states and the nationals of those states which have not acceded to the
Conventions, there would be created a group with no legal obligation to observe

72
even the most rudimentary humane provisions of the Conventions. Such a
position is intolerable in the world community. The better approach is that
expressed by the Nuremberg Court in the High Command Case;
"...(I)t would appear that the IMT. . ,fo 1 ! owed the same line of
thought with regard to the Geneva Convention as with respect to
the Hague Convention to the effect that they were binding in
sofar as they were in substance an expression of international
law as accepted by civilized nations of the world..."-*
It may be concluded that guerrillas and terrorists are bound by the
principles set forth in the POW and Civilian Conventions, and that when they
take prisoners, whether military or civilian, or occupy territory, they are
obliged to comply with the substantive provisions of the appropriate convention,
That their strategy is contrary to this is well known. That their violations
are committed for the same reasons as states violate the Conventions is thus
evident, namely, that immediate or long range objectives are given precedence
over humanitarian values. •
D. Specific Weaknesses of the POW and Civilian Conventions,
The provisions of the POW and Civilian Conventions are ignored because
of several factors which hinder or prevent their enforcement. The first and
most glaring deficiency is that enforcement is by the powers which are
directly involved in the conflict. Hence, each state determines whether it
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will apply the Conventions in a given situation. This permits a state to
unilaterally declare, either that its actions do not violate the Conventions,
or that the Conventions are not applicable, or both. Compounding this defect
is the absence of an impartial investigating body to provide complete infor-
mation on which a state can rely, even to take unilateral action. Thirdly,
there are severe limitations on effective sanctions which may be used in most
instances to enforce the Conventions. The Conventions do provide for a
Protecting Power, but this can be avoided by the expedient of simply refusing
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to accept any state or organization in this capacity, but even when put into
effect, the Protecting Power concept is an administrative rather than enforce-
ment function.
1. Enforcement by Belligerents
Neither the POW nor the Civilian Convention make any provisions for
an impartial fact-gatherer and decision-maker to sort out the conflicting
claims in a combat or near combat situation, and to determine whether the Con-
ventions are applicable in a given case, and if so whether they are being
violated. This deficiency in an international treaty designed to preserve
human lives and property may be attributed to the long accepted concept of
absolute sovereignty on the part of each state, and the lack of an international
organization with the authority to make binding decisions and the power to
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enforce them. Accordingly the Conventions were drafted with the decision-
making function vested in each state to a conflict, thus preserving to each
state its traditional complete sovereignty. One major reason for this situation
is the reluctance, nay, refusal of states, to relinquish to any authority
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the power which could be employed to enforce international obligations.
V/hen the problem of enforcement is thrust upon the individual state, it may
have no choice but to either go to war if the situation has not already
deterioated to that condition, in which case other states may be dragged into
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the conflict, or forget the matter after appropriate diplomatic protests,
in which case it is difficult to characterize the rules violated by the other
state as law.
Although Article 120 and 1^6 of the POW and Civilian Conventions provide
for contracting states to enact appropriate legislation providing penal
sanctions for "grave breaches" of the Conventions, this is of little help when
the state involved, in what it considers its national interest, has adopted an
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official policy which contravanes the Conventions. This places upon the
victorious state the burden of trying before an appropriate tribunal the
vanquished leaders of the state or group which has violated the Conventions.
The victorious state may be reluctant to exercise this authority because of
possible adverse world reaction. Even though great pains were taken to assure
fair trials for the Nazi leaders following Wor Id War II, there were still
charges of injustness, if for no other reason than there is an almost instinc-
tive reluctance to permit one belligerent to try the defeated leaders of
another.
Another inherent difficulty in states attempting to enforce Conventions
providing for humane treatment for prisoners-of-war and civilians, is the
practical consideration that the states are already at war; they have resorted
to force, and in the absence of some neutral power to intervene, they are, in
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addition to fighting a war, required to act as their own policemen. Since
they are already at war, they may have no reserve power, either legal or
illegal, to exert additional pressure on the enemy, in which case they have
no remedy for breaches by the other side.
An eminent writer has assailed the concept of each state being its own
judge in matters of international law, pointing to the weakness of some
states and thus the impractical i ty of their enforcing their international
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rights, and the awesome power of states which possess nuclear weapons. On
the other hand, it has been pointed out that there is no assurance that men
associated together in international political communities can be expected to
320
exercise a higher and more exacting morality than men acting as individuals.
When concerned with the application of power, indeed the question whether men
can act on a higher plane in the international community is highly doubtful.
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In spite of the efforts to fully effectuate the lofty ideals of the United
Nations, partisan political goals rather than impartial notions of justice
prevail, and provide justification for the attitude of skeptics. It may be
concluded that at least so far as control of military power is concerned,
individual states will continue, at least for the forseeable future, to
unilaterally exercise full authority over their respective military forces,
and will likely use them when considered necessary to further their own
national interests, as decided by the particular state.
2. Lack of impartial investigative agency.
Closely allied to the difficulties implicit in the role of decision-
maker and enforcement agent cast upon the individual state involved in
hostilities, is the lack of an impartial investigative agency to ferret out
the facts so the state can make an informed decision. For example, suppose
both parties to a confl ict , deemed that a state of war did not exist. Since
Article 2 of the Convention provides only for a disputed situation in which
one but not both parties deny the existence of war, would the Conventions be
applicable? In this regard it should be remembered that the Conventions ere
321designed to protect individuals, rather than promote state interests. An
investigative agency, empowered to make a full investigation in the field
could quickly ascertain whether there was in fact continuing active hostilities
between the states, as opposed to minor isolated incidents.
3. Sanctions Currently available.
The traditional sanctions available to a belligerent against whom the
rules of war have been violated, are "a. Publication of facts, with a view of
influencing public opinion... b. Protests and demand for compensation... c.
solicitation of the good offices, mediation, or intervention of neutral states
322
...d. Punishment of captured offenders as war criminals, e. Reprisals."
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Of the sanctions generally considered applicable between warring nations only
one, Reprisals, is of a warlike character. Reprisals generally involve a loss
of human life or the destruction of property. For this reason, resort to
reprisals may not be normally taken until other means of effectuating compliance
323
with the rules of war have been exhausted.
The conflict in Viet Nam in which the North Vietnamese have refused to
comply with the POW Convention, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in which Israel
as a matter of policy consistently violates the Civilian Convention, illustrate
the near outer limits of a more powerful state confronted by a weaker one
which refuses to comply with the POW Convention, and of weaker states con-
fronted by a more powerful state which refuses to apply the Civilian Convention.
a. Sanctions in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
In the Arab-Israeli Conflict there has been publication of the facts,
though unfortunately this publication has included di ssimenation of two
versions of the 'facts', neither of which is very reliable. There have been
repeated demands by the Palestinian Refugees for repatriation and/or
compensation, and the diplomatic assistance of neutral states has been sought
by the refugees and Arab states through the United Nations. In turn, the
United Nations has responded with repeated resolutions urging the Israelis
to comply with the provisions of the Civilian Convention." These sanctions
of a peaceful nature have been to no avail. Despite the vocal assistance
being offered by the United Nations, that organization's sincerity is likely
questioned by many Palestinian refugees, since it was the United Nations'
decision to establish a Zionist state in the heart of Palestine, an Arab
controlled society for eighteen hundred years, which instigated the events
leading up to the present state of affairs. Nor could the Palestinian




that Israel need return only those territories occupied since 5 June, 1967?
thus seeming to endorse the Israeli occupation of essentially alt of that
territory which under the partition resolution was to become an Arab state.
Regardless of how the Palestinian refugees and Arab States view the publicity
their situation has received through the United Nations,and the diplomatic
assistance they have received from that quarter, it would seem that the
assistance they have received has been ineffective, and that future diplomatic
moves will also prove ineffective.
Having fruitlessly exhausted essentially all of the diplomatic resources
which might normally be expected to be of some assistance in inducing Israel
to comply with the Civilian Convention, the Palestinian guerrillas and Arab
states would under recognized international principles be permitted to resort
to reprisals. It is at this point that the Palestinian guerrillas and Arab
states are stymied. For they have already been soundly defeated on each of
the three occassions they have engaged in full scale military conflict, against
Israel. It may be presumed that in each of these three engagements, they
employed essentially all of the forces they have available. Further, even if
they possess chemical or biological weapons, experience has shown that their
use would likely bring retaliation in kind by the Israelis.
Over the years, Palestinian refugees through their guerrilla organizations,
and with the apparent approval of the Arab states, have occassional ly launched
attacks against Israeli settlements in occupied territory. Such attacks,
even if accepted as reprisals, have generally been isolated acts giving the
appearance of terrorist acti vi ty, rather than the increasingly acute pressure
designed to induce a belligerent to cease certain illegal conduct. These
isolated attacks have been met with retaliation by Israel, and have ultimately
been more injurious to the Arabs than to the Israelis. Even if it were to be
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accepted (which it cannot be because the attacks are nor even remotely likely
to accomplish their purpose) that the isolated attacks on Israeli settlements
are legitimate reprisals for Israel's violations of the Civilian Convention,
and that the retaliatory attacks by Israel are illegal counter-reprisals, the
Arabs and Palestinian guerrillas are militarily no more capable of compelling
Israel to desist from the counter-reprisals than they are of compelling Israel
to comply with the Civilian Convention.
It is apparent from the foregoing illustration, that where a state with
marked military superiority over another state or states, is in violation of
the rules of war, the weaker states have no means of compelling the stronger
state to desist from its illegal activity, and therefore the right to resort
to reprisals is meaningless.
b. Sanctions in the Viet Nam Conflict.
The Viet Nam conflict presents the reverse of that encountered in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In Viet Nam, one of the two principal powers confronting
North Viet Nam is often described as a world super-power. Yet in Viet Nam, it
is the North Vietnamese who refuse to comply with the POW Convention and who
along with the Viet Cong, rcgularily and as a matter of policy violate the
Civilian Convention as well as the Hague rules of warfare. Because the United
States' direct interest is most apparent in the refusal of the North Vietnamese
to apply the POW Convention to American pri soners-of-war, only that situation
will be discussed here.
The United States has been rebuffed by North Viet Nam in its attempt to
enter into direct negotiations to arrange for administration of the provisions
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of the POW Convention. The International Red Cross has on numerous
occassions offered its services to the North Vietnamese to assist with the
administration of prisoners held by North Viet Nam. On the two occassions in
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which the North Vietnamese have forwarded replies to the International Red
327
Cross, they have refused the offer of that organization. The United States
has contacted neutral countries and countries sympathetic to North Viet Nam,
in efforts to obtain proper treatment for the American prisoners held by North
328
Viet Nam. These efforts have been fruitless." North Viet Nam has failed to
heed an appeal from the Secretary General of the United Nations to permit some
international humanitarian organization to have access to the American captives
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in North Viet Nam. Further, North Viet Nam has publicly stated that the
United States would not get even a list of prisoners held by that country so
long as the war continued, and until the United States had withdrawn its
330
troops.
The United States would thus seem to have exhausted those non-warlike
•sanctions available to it in its efforts to obtain proper treatment for
captured Americans. At the very least, North Viet Nam has made it clear that
further diplomatic efforts would not be productive.
The United States then, is entitled to resort to reprisals. Reprisals
are uniformly defined as "acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which
would otherwise be unlawful .. .for the purpose of enforcing compliance with the
recognized rules of civilized warfare. "331 y^ e traditional definition of
sanctions contemplates the use of non-warlike measures before resorting to
reprisals, and reprisals by definition contemplate the use of means of warfare
which would otherwise be illegal. These definitions were apparently formulated
with the idea that when powers went to war, there would be maximum utilization
of their respective manpower and material resources, within the rules of
legitimate warfare, to attain victory. Within that concept, if one of the
powers violated the rules of war, the other had no legitimate means to rectify
the matter, other than diplomatic channels. If that failed, the only force
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which could be brought to bear would of necessity be force that would other-
wise violate the rules of warfare.
By contrast, had the United States in Viet Nam elected to exert an all
out effort against the North Vietnamese, including the use of nuclear weapons,
invasion and occupation of her territory, and mining her harbors and coastline
along with widespread destruction of her material resources, it would likely
have been a very short war. On the other hand it would appear that North Viet
Nam has been making an all out effort in its struggle with the United States
and would, therefore, be expected to have few legitimate forces in reserve.
The United States still has a number of legitimate means of warfare which
could be used against North Viet Nam, and could, discounting the risk of having
to fight other super-powers, bring an end to the war without regard to the
question of reprisals.
The question is then raised, is the United States required to use the
means of legitimate warfare still at its disposal before resorting to what is
in the traditional definition, reprisals, or illegitimate means of warfare?
Or put another way, do these unused legitimate military resources become means
of reprisal even though they do not meet the "illegitimate" test of the
traditional reprisals, or are they an additional sanction which must be
exhausted before resorting to illigitimate means of warfare. It is generally
accepted that "Other means of securing compliance with the law of war should
normally be exhausted before resort to reprisal *>. uJJ
If it is postulated that the reason other means of securing compliance
with the rules of war should be exhausted before resorting to reprisals, is
to minimize the destruction of human and material values, while at the same
time compelling compliance with the rules of war by the other belligerent,
then the traditional definition of reprisals would not seem to fit the fact
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situation in Viet Nam. The traditional definition would require that the
United States use nuclear weapons, mine the harbors and coastline of North
Viet Nam, (which has recently been done) and perhaps invade that country if
North Viet Nam refused to comply with the POW Convention, while at the same
time denying less spectacular but perhaps effective means of compelling
compliance because they are "illegal".
Logically, it would seem that values for which protection is sought by
the restricted circumstances in which reprisals may be used, could best be
preserved by a re-evaluation of the circumstances under which a nation is
justified in resorting to means of illegitimate warfare. This reconsideration
should look not to whether the means used is legal or illegal within the
present definition, but instead to whether the means employed is reasonably
calculated to attain the desired end with the minimum loss of human and material
valued, as compared to another available means which might in and of itself
meet the test as a legal means of warfare, but which if employed would result
in considerably greater loss of human and material values. This approach
would seem to require that when in a reprisal situation, and offered alter-
natives which would accomplish the objective, the means that would accomplish
the objective with the minimum loss of human and material values should be
selected regardless of whether the means employed is legal or illegal.
Because of its enormous military advantage over North Viet Nam, the
United States has many military resources, both legal and illegal, which
could be used against North Viet Nam. Among those resources arc nuclear
weapons, invasion of North Viet Nam, defoliation of North Viet Nam's crops, J
33*+
destruction of the systems of dams and dikes used in agriculture, and
chemical and biological agents.

82
Although at the present time there seems to be little real difference
in the resolution of the dilemmas confronting the Arab states whose military
position is decidedly inferior to that of Israel, and the United States which
is militarily superior to North Viet Nam, the real difference between the two
situations is that the Arab states have no military pressure to apply even in
reprisal, while the United States, for whatever reason, has not yet chosen to
unmask several effective means of reprisal available to it. This should
illustrate that the sanctioning process in the enforcement of the POW and
Civilian Conventions may be ineffective both because a state or other power
lacks the means to enforce the provisions, or having the maans, choses not to
utilize them. The result however, is the same. The humanitarian rules
embodied in the conventions continue to be disregarded.
c. Trials of War Criminals
Other that reprisals and diplomatic pressures, there is a third type of
sanction which would seem to be properly placed in the category of a peaceful
sanction, and yet which depends on force, or at least the threat of force for
its effectiveness. This measure relies on the deterrent effect of criminal
legislation prohibiting certain acts and providing for punishment where such
acts occur. Such an approach would seem to have a place in the world order,
for how can rules be justified which punish a private individual for both
minor and major crimes, but do not punish those state officials guilty of




The POW and Civilian Convention obligate each state signatory to enact
legislation providing penal sanctions for persons responsible for "grave
337breaches" of those conventions. Under these Conventions, there are no
. .
338
provisions for international tribunals. In fact, detaini ng powers are
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prohibited from trying pri soners-of-war by special ad hoc national courts,
339
and as a practical matter by International Military Tribunals.' Trials for
violations of these Conventions then will normally be before national tribunals
Although, the Conventions provide for extradition of those accused of
3Z4O
violations of the Conventions, it is not mandatory that states make such
provisions for extradition. Therefore whether persons will be extradited to
a state interested in trying a war criminal, depends solely on the detaining
state. 3^1 It would seem that if all states complied with the penal sanctions
suggested in the Conventions, there would be few violations of the Conventions,
for those individuals inclined to violate them, would quickly be imprisoned
pursuant to the Convention's penal sanctions, which include a duty to try
offenders, or permit their extradition. *
It has been asserted that the threat of war crimes trials after the
3^3
cessation of hostilities may be an effective deterrent. However, this
assertion as well as the penal provisions of the POW and Civilian Conventions
are ineffective deterrents simply because the individual who grasps for great
power, is driven by an ambition which places his personal aspirations before
anything else, even his own safety, and when this is combined with supposed
patriotism and confidence of victory, the deterrent effect is nullified.
It may be surmised that unless a state chooses to enforce the Conventions
against its own nationals, at a municipal level, the Conventions will be
ineffective during hostilities. Where the state's leaders see their own
interests as requiring that the Conventions be violated, as has Israel in
regard to the Civilian Convention, and North Viet Nam in regard to the POW
Convention, these conventions in the absence of stong measures by the opposing




E. Current Sanctioning Process is Ineffective
The measure of effectiveness of a sanctioning process should be reflected
in the number of times, when put to the test, it has achieved the goals for
which it was intended. On this scale the current sanctioning process ranks
dismally low. The experiences of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Viet Nam
War have only fortified the principle that states will not yield to diplomatic
moves to comply with humanitarian principles when the states objectives would
seem to be best served by disregarding those principles.
Reprisals have proven ineffective in the Arab-Israel i conflict, largely
because the Arabs and the Palestinian guerrillas lack the military power to
effectively exert reprisal pressure. If the numerous terrorist type actions
by the guerrillas were intended as reprisals, they have failed because of the
lack of sufficient power and at the same time have disclosed a defect in the
concept of reprisals. For. an otherwise illegitimate act of war to become
valid as a reprisal, there must be soma reasonable expectation of its success,
yet it must not grossly exceed the amount of force required to accomplish the
objective. A Palestinian guerrilla assertion that their acts were
reprisals then would fail, not because of a disproportionate excess of force,
but because there was no reasonable expectation that the available force would
succeed. The Israeli claims that the actions were acts of terrorism and that
the Israeli actions were reprisals, would seem to be valid. Israel then
3^7
would not be guilty of illegitimately using counter-reprisals, ' and the
point is made, that reprisals are as a practical matter available only to
states with the power to make them effective. The Viet Nam status of American
pri soners-of-war, illustrates that even an extremely powerful nation may be
deterred from resorting to effective reprisals^ei ther because of internal
political problems, or because it is so much stronger than the other belligerent
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that reprisal action would be repugnant to the international community. Hence,
reprisals may not always be available to those who have the power. Further,
reprisals may lead to counter-reprisals, regardless of the respective merits
of the two actions, and may result in a downward spiral of regard for humani-
tarian values. It would seem then that, where national interests are
predominant, it may be concluded that neither peaceful nor warlike sanctions
as presently exercised are likely to be effective.
Although war crimes trials are sometimes hailed as a potent deterrent
force, in reality such trials are impractical during active hostilities,
except where a state tries its own nationals, because the opposing side
generally holds prisoners whom it is likely to try if trials are held by the
35C
other belligerent during hostilities. As a practical matter then, war
crime trials of belligerents on the opposing side may occur only when that
side has been totally defeated, and the risk of that is not so great as to
deter illegal activity in the absence of enforcement by each side against its
own nationals.
It may be concluded that the present world sanctioning process for the
POW and Civilian Conventions is almost totally ineffective.
IV. Characteristics of a Desirable Sanctioning Process.
A. Comprehensive Sanctioning Process
Ideally, the most effective and satisfactory sanctioning process for the
POW and Civilian Conventions is one which would serve to resolve all inter-
national problems as they arise, rather than attacking the problems on a
351piecemeal basis. Such a process would require that organs be established
which are responsible for collecting relevant and accurate data, evaluating
that data, reaching conclusions and prescribing sanctions which would be




determining when they should be terminated. Unfortunately the states in
the contemporary world have repeatedly demonstrated that they will not vest
such all encompassing power in any entity. It is thus necessary for inter-
national lawyers to try to work within the existing framework, and reach
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workable solutions to everyday problems within the limits of hard practicality.
B. A Sanctioning Process Attainable in the Forseeable Future
Although the world does not seem to be prepared to accept a central all-
encompassing sanctioning process, perhaps in this century the world has
become small enough so that a limited sanctioning process, based on humani-
tarian principles and still under the control of the states, would be an
acceptable alternative. If such a process could be successfully implemented,
then perhaps the principles learned in its execution could be applied in other
fields. Still, there are tremendous difficulties involved in reaching an
acceptable agreement between a sufficient number of states to implement even
a limited international sanction process, where the two principle blocs of
states appear to have near irreconcilable interests. Such 3 process might,
however, be commenced within the framework of existing international organi-
zations and treaties. It is perhaps within those existing institutions and
agreements , that minimum requirements for a sanctioning process for the POW and
Civilian Conventions could be provided to institute an impartial investigative
agency, a respected and impartial deci si on-maker ,and some reasonably effective
sanctions.
1. Impartial Investi gative Agency
Many of the crucial "facts" from the Viet Nam and Arab-Israel i conflicts
are subject to question because there is no centralized, highly respected
impartial fact finding agency, wi th free access to both sides of the conflict
arena. Although the United Nations has been involved to a considerable degree
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in this process, it has been unable to have the free access required for
objective fact-finding. Indeed the United Nations team was compelled to
withdraw from areas vital to the acquisition of required information immediately
35k
before the June I967 Arab-Israeli war.
The greatest hurdle in establishing an effective investigative agency,
is finding investigators who will be respected and whose determinations will
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be accepted as creditable. Although the Civilian Convention provides for
an investigation in the event that charges of violations are brought by a
party to a conflict, there is a problem in actually putting this provision
into practice because the investigators are not chosen until after the conflict
arises. The entire process can therefore be thwarted by refusing to agree
on investigators. In any revision of the present process, this defect must
be eliminated, by determining beforehand who will be responsible for conducting
investigations.
2. Decision Maker
Perhaps the greatest fault of the sanctions available to enforce the POW
and Civilian Convention is that there is no authoritative power vested with
the responsibility to determine whether the Conventions are applicable in an
actual set of circumstances, and if so, whether they are being violated.
There should be such an authority designated in the Convention, whose decision
will be binding. Of prime importance in the selection of an acceptable
decision-maker is that issues based on race or religion, or involving large
or small nations, be decided on a non-denominational, non-discriminating and
non-political basis.
3. Effective sanctions
The last requirement for a realistic sanctioning process is that there b




purpose and can be rapidly removed when there is compliance with the Convention
involved. It is suggested that to accomplish this, the active cooperation of
al
1
states will be required, rather than the somewhat ambiguous language of
the present Article 1 of the POW and Civilian Conventions which merely states
that; "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect
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for the present Convention in all circumstances." The sanctions should be
forceful enough so that they assure a transgressor that he has more to gain
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by compliance, than by non-compliance.
V. Considerations Involved in the Establishment of a Sanctioning Process for
the POW and Civilian Conventions.
"The more one goes into the topic of sanctions at present, however,
the more is he puzzled concerning their value and usefulness. It is
true that treaty observance is important but is it not also true,
that in a world where nationalism is rampant, only those treaties
which states consider to be to their advantage will be kept regardless
of special sanctions, and that where treaties stand in the way of...
"politics of power', no amount of implementation on paper will deter
a violator?" org
Payson S. Wild, Jr., 193^
In the nearly forty years since the above lines were written, there has
been one major war involving nearly every state in the world, plus many smaller
ones such as in Korea, the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and the Viet Nam
war. Awesome weapons have been invented and used, and deployed in preparation
for further use, whi le the world's two most powerful nations maneuver for
ultimate world supremacy. In the way of treaty enforcement, however, little
has changed. The need for enforcement, exclusive of power politics is the
same. One thing which has evolved, more perhaps in the last twenty years
than at any other time, has been a growing awareness of individual human
rights, at least in the non-communist states. It is this awareness, parti-
cularly among those nations just emerging from colonial rule, combined with
the desire of the opposing major world powers to gain influence over those
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nations, which might afford an opportunity to bring forth a fledging world
sanctioning process, at least in regard to the POW and Civilian Conventions.
The peculiarly humanitarian nature of these Conventions affords a vehicle
embodying principles which any state would be hard pressed to publicly refute.
The problem is to find sanctions which are as acceptable to the individual
states as arc the principles set forth in these Conventions. In formulating
such a process, it is necessary first to determine which entities will be
concerned in the process, what their interests are, the objectives of the
sanctions, who will be the decision makers and investigators, the targets of
the sanctions selected, what specific sanctions are to be employed, and how
the sanctions will be executed.
A. Who will participate in the Sanctioning Process?
The ineffectiveness of the present Conventions to a great extent is due
to the exclusive role placed on the belligerents to assure enforcement. Such
a process amounts to little more than international anarchy. An inclusive
system, by contrast, would function much as a municipal society, with all the
states backing what would in effect become criminal legislation for the
enforcement of human rights in any coercion process.
1. States Parties"
Since States are the basic entities which make up the world order, they
will collectively be the primary participants in any sanctioning process. In
the present world community, in which various nations enter into alliances
with, or have common interests with states which oppose the interests of other
groups or alliances of states, and in which there are conflicting views as to
the role of man in society, and the nature of society itself, the mutual
acceptance of common values in a sanctioning process is exceedingly difficult.
The states may however, generally be grouped into three catagories based on
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their ideology. These alliances are commonly referred to as the free-world
bloc - those states primarily based on the capitalist system; the Communist
bloc - those states based on a Marxist ideology; and the third world bloc -
or those states just emerging from colonial rule. Although there are
differences among the various states in any particular bloc, and there are
some exceptions as to how these states react in a given situation, the states
in each bloc generally act wi th a common interest in international affairs.
2. International Organizations.
a. Worldwide Public and Private Organizations.
Principle among those existing worldwide organizations which could be
utilized to participate in a sanctioning process for the POW and Civilian
Conventions, are the United Nations and the International Committee of the
Red Cross. In its comments submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General
in June 1971 concerning Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, the
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic indicated that the United Nations should
?6l
play an important role in the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions. Since
the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic is actually a part of the Soviet Union,
in the same sense as Kentucky is a part of the United States, it may be
assumed that the Soviets used this method of putting forth the Communist view
without at the same time committing the Soviet Union to a particular position.
This would seem to offer some hope that the Communist bloc would accept a
role for the United Nations in a sanctioning process. The United States
however may have some reservations about involving the United Nations in these
functions. Although many states are beginning to urge that there be some
sort of international regulation of the Conventions still a number of states
of which Belgium is typical, have expressed hesitancy at supplementing the
role of the International Red Cross.-' In General, there seems to be a
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consensus among states for some role for the United Nations, and for the
continued and perhaps an increased role for the International Red Cross. The
use of existing international organi zati ons , rather than forming new specialized
365
ones ,seems to be the accepted consensus of at least the communist states.
b. Regional Organizations
The question, "Should the role of regional organizations in supervision
(of the Conventions) be examined?" was sent to those states participating in
the 1972 Conferences on the Geneva Conventions. The replies indicated that
slightly more states were in favor of a role for these organizations than were
opposed to such a role. Those in favor generally recognized that the
regional organizations had considerable power in the areas involved, while
those which were opposed seemed to consider that such organizations were not
sufficiently objective. Although it is difficult to deny the power of regional
organizations such as the Organization of American States, SEATO, NATO, and
the European Common Market, the effectiveness of a number of regional organi-
zations attempting to apply sanctions which will likely require worldwide
cooperation, in the absence of an authoritative coordinating body is highly
questionable.
3. Guerrilla Organizations
A third group which will be involved as a participant in a sanctioning
process are the various guerrilla organizations and "freedom fighters"
scattered throughout the world. Although these organizations have no recog-
nized international capacity, they do in fact exist, and they are responsible
either directly or indirectly for a considerable amount of the conflict in the
modern world. Whatever their legal capacity, they will be participants in any
effective sanctioning process, if for no other reason than they will likely
become the object of sanctions. If such is the case, the leaders of these
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organizations will find it necessary to revise their tactics, and will of
necessity be required from time to time to meet with other officials involved
in the sanctioning process to determine what is required of them. Some states,
particularly those against which the guerrillas are working, may not think
very highly of this since they will feel such meetings imply some sort of
international recognition of the guerrillas. Still, it has been suggested,
and the rationale seems sound that:
"States by becoming Contracting Parties recognize in advance a
limited legal personality in persons who may in future group
themselves as rebels in armed conflict against the de jure
government. The recognition conceded in this manner is sufficient
to enable the rebel party to exercise the legal rights and be
subject to the legal duties imposed by Article 3. •'•2"/
B. Interests of Participants in the Sanctioning Process.
In order for an International sanctioning process to be effective, it
must include most of the states, and some international organizations, to
secure a broad power base for the implementation of sanctions, as well as for
general acceptance of the process. Of vital importance however, is the
absolute necessity for the support of the major world powers, such as the
United States, Russia, Communist China, the United Kingdom, and France, and
the support of highly industral ized states such as Japan. All states which
manufacture significant quantities of war materials are of particular impor-
tance to a sanctioning process because the belligerent factions require such
materials to engage in significant hostilities. It is these powers which must
be participants in any sanctioning process, whose interests are of special
concern. If their interests can be furthered by supporting the POW and
Civilian Conventions, then the probability of implementing effective inter-
national sanctions will be greatly enhanced, for it is with them that the real
muscle for sanctions reside. The interests of these and other states can be
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catagorized according to predominate state interests, while the interests of
International organizations which might be participants in a sanctioning
process, depend on the purpose and goals of the entity as determined by its
state members.
1. International Interests.'- .
The two international organizations most likely to be directly involved
in a sanctioning process are the United Nations and the International Red




(M)aintain international cooperation in solving international problems of
368
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character..." The inter-
national Red Cross was formed and functions solely as a humanitarian organi-
369
zation. Most rules of warfare are humanitarian in character, but especially
are those set forth in the POW and Geneva Conventions, the sole purpose of
370
which are to safeguard human values. One of the prime interests of the
United Nations and the International Red Cross is to see that the principles
embodied in these Conventions are made effective. The International Conference
of Human Rights held in Teheran in April and May, 1968, recognized the parti-
cular interests of the United Nations in this field, and specifically called
upon the General Assembly to initiate a study to determine how these conventions
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among others of a humanitarian character, could be better enforced. It
would seem that at least the hope of many states is that the United Nations is
to serve as a humanitarian organization where possible. The interests of the
United Nations, are however, controlled by the interests of its members. In
what future role the United Nations might be cast, or in what direction its





The national interests of a state may and frequently do come into
conflict with humanitarian principles in the contemporary world. In the past,
where a civil conflict was confined within the borders of a state, there was
no question of international interests being involved. Now, however, as
states find themselves allied with one of the three principle blocs in the
world community, even otherwise internal conflicts take on international
significance in their potential to shift the alliance of a state to one or
the other of the three blocs. One cannot therefore consider the national
interests of a state without recognizing the international implications of
those interests. National interests in the contemporary world seem to
generally revolve around two basic international values which are themselves
interrelated. The first of these is the individual state efforts to acquire
territory. Closely related to this is the interests of the major blocs of
states in the type of government established over a given territory, for the
internal matter of government, determines the bloc with which a state will
ally itself, and hence affects the scope of the sphere of influence and
potential collective power of the states in a given bloc.
a. Territorial Acquisition on the part of a "client" state.
Any analysis of the support being provided to the belligerents in Viet
Nam, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, discloses that the United States, the
leader in the free-world bloc, and Russia, the leader of the Communist bloc,
are backing the side which they consider will benefit their national interests,
The North Vietnamese objective is to conquer South Viet Nam and thus force it
into the Communist mold. The Israeli objective is to carve out an empire in
the middle east, and the United States of course has hopes of this empire
being allied with the free-world bloc. In each conflict, there is the common
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element of territorial acquisition by a small state, with expectations of a
major backing power, that the acquired territory will be brought into its
sphere of influence. The two interests, i.e. territorial acquisition and
spheres of influence, cannot be separated, but are complimentary to one another.
Further, it is the free-world bloc and the Communist bloc which are primarily
involved in this struggle for territorial influence, with the emerging states
being more the target of the conflict, than a participant. The conflicting
interests of the leaders of the two major blocs provide armaments and advice
thus leading to wars which are perhaps longer, and certainly more destructive
of human values than if no power struggle between the major powers was involved.
In the contemporary world however, one fact stands out. While the United
States struggles to maintain the status quo , the Communist bloc, following a
course of spawning revolution and guerrilla wars, seeks to acquire territory
which can be permanently brought under Communist control. Their aims arc
concisely set out in the Manifesto of the Communist Party:
"The communists di stain to conceal their views and aims. They
openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible
overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes
tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians hove nothing
to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. "372
That a communist government, once firmly entrenched will be fully
supported by Russian armed forces regardless of the wishes of the people, was
dramatically demonstrated in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia where the Russians
directly intervened when Communist control was threatened. The justification
advanced for this intervention was the claim that "resort to force 'in defense
373
of the victories of socialism* is permissible under the law of co-existence."
The concept of sovereignty of each state is thus, within the Soviet bloc being
replaced with a concept of state Sovereignty secondary to the interests of
37Z1
the Communist bloc as a whole. In this manner, Russia actually acquires
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territory, while ostensibly preserving the national identity of a state by not
officially annexing it. This same type of philosophy is in operation in
Africa among the emerging bloc, as recently independent states afford bases
375
and other assistence to guerrillas operating against adjoining states.
b. Spheres of Influence
The desire of leaders of the major blocs to gain influence in various
areas of the world is one which contributes immensley to localized conflicts.
The United States aim for markets and sources of raw materials, without
assuming political control of the individual states, and the Russian dogma
of gaining political control secondary to trade factors, are in constant
conflict, and are subject to exploitation by other states. Thus, Israel used
a common religious background and an effective public relations program to
isolate the United States from the Arab states and gain its support in the war
against them, while Russia, perceiving an opportunity to enter the Mediterranean
backed the Arab States.
c. Effects of participants interests on implementing sanctions for the
Geneva Conventions.
The commercial and political interests represented by the various
potential participants in a sanctioning process,may contravene, or at least
significantly hinder the full recognition of the humanitarian interests
implicit in the POW and Civilian Conventions. Particularly in states with
the capitalist economic system, the possible cost of sanctions in terms of
commercial activity may be especially relevant to the states position on the
active enforcement of sanctions.-''' Economic sanctions always pose the
probability of at least temporary and perhaps permanent loss of lucrative
markets and sources for raw materials. This effect would be most prelevant in
the United States and states with similar economic interests.
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The Communist bloc on the other hand, has devised a philosophy which
would permit them to vocally act as a champion of human rights so far as
guerrilla activity is concerned, and at the same time avoid any requirement
to apply the conventions themselves, or being placed in a position to require
that guerrillas which they support comply with the Conventions. The first
step in this rationale, is the assertion that all activity in opposition to a
non-communist power is of an international character. This brings the
guerrillas within the PQW or Civilian Conventi on. "9 At the same time, action
by any other group is labeled as "aggressive" or "unjust", as is the use of
nuclear weapons. By maintaining that only wars of national liberation and
defensive wars are "just" wars, ' as is military action to compel continued
membership in the Communist bloc, ' the Communist can maintain that all other
383
military action constitutes war crimes, and the rules governing prisoners
38*+
of war cannot be extended to persons engaged in such activity. In short,
any action which opposes an attempted armed conquest of a state by Communist
forces, or communist controlled forces, is labeled as aggression and condemed
as illegal. Hence persons opposing the communists are war criminals and the
386
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POW Convention is not applicable to them. Such an approach entirely
ignores the humanitarian principles of the POW and Civilian Conventions.
When combined with the Communist concept that persons who surrender are
traitors, which was evidenced by the Russians in World War II, and the
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North Vietnamese in the Viet Nam War, plus the communist accepted role of
terror tactics by "freedom fighters", the application of the Conventions is
destroyed except as the so-called "aggressor" forces unilaterally elect to
apply them. In spite of its inconsistencies, this line of reasoning may have
particular appeal to emerging African states which generally consider inter-




colonial powers, and are therefore prone to maintain that much international
law is opposed to their interests, is not universally accepted (by them), and
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therefore not law. So long as this rationale will seem to benefit those
states, it is likely to be followed. However, the idealistic human rights
provisions many of them have included in their Constitutions might be used to
induce them to actively support a sanctioning process for humanitarian
principles ^provided they have a hand in setting up the process.
In any event, it is between states with conflicting interests and
philosophies, that some system of workable sanctions for humanitarian prin-
ciples in armed conflicts need be arranged. The key will be not so much in
finding either a system to decide controversies concerning the Conventions,
or even the means to enforce the Conventions if applicable, but rather to
enlist the cooperation of those nations with interests as conflicting as
those of the participants in the Viet Nam and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
C. What are the Objectives of a Sanctioning Process for the PQW and
Civilian Conventions.
The objectives of sanctions for the POW and Civilian Conventions is to
preserve human life and consequential property, and to minimize human suffering
through vigorous application of the principles contained in the Conventions.
These objectives are therefore quite limited in that they do not seek to
materially interfere with the traditional concept of military necessity, but
rather only to eliminate or minimize unnecessary destruction of human and
material values. Although a more lofty objective could be the elimination of
the need for regulating injury to non-combatants by eliminating armed conflict,
391
or at least minimizing its frequency and scope, that objective is not
feasible within the forseeable future. The next best objective is that of
minimizing the human loss caused by such conflicts. A major objective of a
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sanctioning process then, is to convince the various states that their interests
will be enhanced more by complying with, than with disregarding the humani-
tarian principles of the POW and Civilian Conventions.
D. Who are to be the Decision-Makers
1. Parties to the Conflict.
Experience has shown that states and other entities involved either
directly or indirectly in an armed conflict, are not competent to make an
objective determination concerning the application of humanitarian principles.
The desire to acquire territory has clearly led to Israel's violation of the
Civilian Convention, as had the same desire by North Viet Nam led at least in
part to violations of the POW Convention. The individual state interest which
consistently override humanitarian values, thus disqualifies individual states
as the arbitrator of their own disputes as they concern humanitarian interests.
There has been an increasing realization by the community of states that
international cooperation is necessary in many fields. Commercial arrangements
more frequently involve international cooperation among states with common
392
economic interests. The growth of international organizations in areas
other than commercial activity, has began to reflect the shift from the indi-
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vidual sovereignty concept. There has even been one notable concerted
effort by most states to impose non-military sanctions against a state alleged
to be in violation of basic human rights within its own borders. The principle
asserted as justification for this action was that such action by its very
39/4
nature could not be confined within the borders of the state. Each of
these situations reflects a growing tendency to rely more on multi-state action
rather than each state acting as its own judge, and provides evidence of a
possible willingness for the collective world community to accept, and the




Even when an international decision-maker is accepted by the states, it
is unlikely that all authority to take action considered vital to its interests
would be surrendered. Most likely, some reservation of legitimate authority
to act in an emergency situation would still reside with the state. Such
reserve of power could be patterned after Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, which permits a state to act in self defense in case of an armed
395
attack, until the Security Council can act. Even where there is a sanc-
tioning process which can effectively enforce the POW and Civilian Conventions,
it may be expected that each state will continue to act as its own decision-
maker within limited circumstances. However, the fact that their actions will
be subject to review when a duly authorized authority investigates the matter
and renders a decision on the merits, should inhibit illegal actions taken
solely in self-interest.
2. International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Red Cross has long been the leading international body
in administering the provisions of the POW and Civilian Conventions. This
organization has observed that an objective determination of the existence
of types of armed conflict would in itself lead to better definitions of these
types of conflict. It has further noted the impractica 1 i ty of creating a new
body for this job. At the same time, the International Red Cross has stated
396that it did not desire to assume a role as a fact finder. It would seem
that the reluctance of the International Red Cross to be involved as a fact-
finder is consistent with its reputation as a humanitarian organization. To
cast itself in the role of making findings for and against certain states or
other entities, would subject the organization to charges of bias by states
or organizations di spleased wi th its decisions, and reduce the present level
of respect for its impartiality as a humanitarian organization.

101
3. Regional or Ad Hoc State Organizations.
The alliance of most states with one f the three blocs of states, with
competing political, idealogical, and economic interests renders the idea of
using regional state organizations, or ad hoc international state commissions
as impractical as permitting individual states to act as their own decision-
makers. The role of regional organizations has recently been considered in
relation to their possible role in enforcing the Conventions, and while most
states favored some role for these organizations, a large minority opposed any
such role because of the lack of objectivity of regional organizations, again
reflecting the belief that national interests would dictate a state's actions?"'
At the same time, collective action by states acting as decision makers was
398
considered and determined to be impractical for much the same reason. Such
an arrangement would therefore not be acceptable to many states, and would
actually leave the enforcement provisions much as they are in current Article
1 of the Conventions, and at least as ineffective.
4, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.
The United Nations was founded partially with the idea that it would
399perform duties of a humanitarian character. Although matters "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state, were excluded from matters
the United Nations was empowered to handle, sufficient power was theo-
retically awarded to the United Nations Organization, or specifically to the
Security Council to assure that the will of the Security Council could be
iiOi
enforced in any situation on which the members might agree. In fact,
the United Nations through the Security Council was give all the tools required
of a sanctioning process, including the investigatory power to ferret out
facts on which it could act. Although provided with all the machinery
needed to operate as a peacekeeping organization, the Security Council
finds that it cannot effectively act on any matter of real consequence.
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The five permanent members of the Security Council are the leaders in the
three blocs of nations whose national interests are invariably at stake in any
403
armed conflict, and any one of these five states can veto any matter of
substance before the Council and thus paralyze the United Nations in its
peacekeeping function. It has been convincingly argued that a requirement
of unanimity among the great powers must be met before any action of conse-
405
quence be taken. Although this argument has to a limited extent been
406
successfully rebuted, it is only the most unusual situation where the veto
will not be effective, and it is unlikely that a major power would either
abstain or be absent when an important issue is before the council.
Despite the inability of the United Nations as currently constituted to
afford an effective sanctioning process even, for humanitarian purposes,
nearly half of the states queried before the 1972 Conference on the Geneva
Conventions indicated they would oppose the establishment of a permanent
supervisory body within the United Nations, because the United Nations might
407
have to become directly involved in the Conflict. The political character
of the United Nations security council and General Assembly would thus seem
to conflict with an impartial vote. Certainly the Great Powers would never
consent to having the Security Council made subordinate to the General Assembly
as has been suggested by some writers, if for no other reason than that the
General Assembly, where each state regardless of how large or small, has but
one vote, is not representative of the peoples of the world either on a basis
409
of power or of population.
A predominant role for the United Nations General Assembly or Security
Council in a sanctioning process for the POW and Civilian Conventions there-
fore would not be likely, or even desirable, because of the conflicting
interests of the major powers.
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5. International Court of Justice
Although neither the United Nations Security Council nor the General
Assembly would be acceptable as a decision-maker because of their political
makeup, there is one organ of the United Nations equipped to make juridical
determinations on such matters as treaty interpretation and treaty violations.
The International Court of Justice as the judicial organ of the United Nations,
is staffed with Judges whose background is primarily in the judicial rather
than political field. The International Court of Justice is an existing
organization with experience in international judicial affairs. All members
Ml
of the United Nations are parties to the Statute of the court, and although
many states have acceded to the jurisdiction of the court with reservations,
nearly every state's accession is broad enough to cover the interpretation
and determination of the application of treaties such as the POW and Civilian
Conventions. Further the Court has the authority to request information from
public international organizations which would include any United Nations
agency or other international body, including a committee specified in an
international treaty.
There are however several problems in selecting the International Court
of Justice as a decision-maker. One of the more obvious difficulties is that
not all parties directly involved in a conflict are states. Most of the
present combat involves guerrilla bands even where they are not the primary
combatants. The statute for the International Court of Justice limits its
k] 3jurisdiction to states, with no provision for other entities. On the other
hand the jurisdiction does provide for cases which are referred to it by parties
to the statute, or which are referred to it pursuant to "treaties and conven-
tions in force." Since most of the guerrilla organizations either have the
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backing of a state or states, or operate from bases in a nearby state with or
without permission of that state, it would seem that there are enough states
with very real interests for at least one state to bring the matter before the
Court either as a representative of the guerrillas, or as a defendant accused
of providing arms, or training, or of harboring the guerrillas. Certainly,
the Arab-Israel i conflict could get before the Court, although an indirect
route would be needed to get the Viet Nam conflict before that tribunal since
neither North or South Viet Nam are members of the United Nations. Perhaps
the United States and either Russia or Communist China would be the parties
actually before the Court in that case. In any event, the cooperation of all
the major powers will be required if the Conventions are to work at all. If
those states can be persuaded to accede to treaty provisions for real sanctions
for the POW and Civilian Conventions, it would seem likely that pursuant to
Article 35 of the statue of the Court, they would also support limited
provisions to afford all signatories of the Conventions access to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, exclusive of specific provisions in the Conventions.
for matters pertaining to the Conventions, whether the states were also members
M5
of the United Nations or not.
Despite the reluctance of the Communist states to broaden the powers of
the Court on the basis that the United States desires to use the court as a
means of perpetrating its control over world affairs as a result of losing
control of the General Assembly, most states strongly support a role for
the United Nations in the enforcement of the Conventions. ' It is submitted
that in view of the limited objectives of the treaties, and the expressed
desire of most nations to have those standards enforced, it would be difficult
for any major state to maintain its position of concern for humanitarian
principles and still refuse to submit the interpretation of the treaty to the
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court. Such a position would likely be more injurious to that state's interest
among the newly independent states than would any decision of the court in the
matter in contention. The increasing worldwide interest in human rights,
especially among newly independent states is a factor which cannot be ignored
by the major powers, and it is from that quarter that pressure favorable to
the adoption of measures which could enforce the POW and Civilian Convention,
could come.
E. Targets of Sanctions
Before it is possible to determine the kind of sanctions which should be
applied in a particular instance, it is necessary to determine which individuals
or groups of individuals are to be the targets of the sanctions selected. In
this respect there are generally four choices. The enemies armed forces, his
national leaders, or the general population, or any combination of these three.
The enemies armed forces are the most likely targets of armed reprisals, its
population a likely target for either legal or illegal destructive force or
severe economic sanctions, while its leaders may be the targets of the sanctions
directed against either the armed forces or the population in the sense that
such pressures on the armies and population may be transmitted to the leaders
in the form of threats to the leaders' power. The leaders are also subject
to trial as war criminals if their forces are totally defeated and they fall
into the hands of opposing forces. It has been previously noted in this
aaticle however, that the threat or possibility of trial as a war criminal,
likely has little deterrent effect on the type individual who strives for
great power.
It has been urged that sanctions should be directed only against a
state's leaders, because it is those persons who arc responsible for the
international derelictions. This approach demands that the acts of the
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leaders be considered as violating not only International Law, but also the
state Constitution, so that the act is therefore illegal under municipal law.
The people therefore should not be held liable for an act which is contrary
418
to their constitution. From this rationale it would follow that a
sanctioning process should be directed against individual leaders rather than
the state as such.
Almost directly opposed to the idea of accountability of only the
leaders for derelictions, is Hans Kelsen's observation that in practice,
sanctions are necessarily directed against individuals other than those
directly responsible for the international delicts. This is justified in his
view because sanctions permitted in international law "constitute collective
liability of the members of the state for the international delicts committed
420
by the government". On the other hand it has been suggested that in
real i ty ,sancti ons (other than violence) directed against the state as a whole
does not really affect the general population to any degree, except for those
involved in international affairs or investments, for the rank and file of the
citizenry continue with their lives as they were before the sanctions were
421
appl ied.
It would seem that although the targets of sanctions are the leaders of
a state which is violating a treaty or other international obligation in a
422given set of circumstances, it is as a practical matter impossible to
directly reach the leaders. Sanctions then should be directed against either
the population or armed forces in such a manner that when applied, they will
threaten the power base of the leaders, whether that base is military power
or the support of the people. It is the armed forces and the population who
have been and will doubtless continue to be the immediate targets of sanctions,
with the ultimate goal being to affect the conduct of leaders through an
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erosion of confidence or internal pressure. Such sanctions must therefore be
accompanied by some formof communication to the immediate targets as to why
the sanctions are being applied and what action is required before they will
cease.
F. What Sanctions are to be used?
In evaluating sanctions which may be used to enforce the POW and Civilian
Conventions, it is first necessary to consider what the side violating the
Conventions has to gain by the violation. Since effective sanctions for the
laws of war are "...the common conviction of the participants in the war or
hostilities that self-interest is advanced by adhering to the law rather than
423
by violating it," it is necessary to determine what specific sanctions, when
applied will result in the loss of the objective which the belligerent hoped
to gain by violating the rules involved. It has been noted elsewhere in this
article that war crimes trials are not an effective deterrent and except for
an anti-climatic event following a total victory, are not likely to be applied
on an international scale. In any event, it would be necessary to secure the
support of nearly all states to activate an international criminal tribunal,
and even then there is a substantial problem in getting the individual involved
in hand to try him. without having to institute a full scale war against his
state. The process would probably be more destructive of human values than
the violations committed by the individual in the first instance. It was
perhaps with such considerations in mind, that a majority of the states
participating in the 1972 Conference on the Geneva Conventions opposed an




1. General Considerations in the Selection of Sanctions.
Merely because a sanctioning process might be undertaken by essentially
the entire world community does not mean that the sanctions to be applied
are to be entirely without regulation as to severity or duration. Only the
minimum force or other sanction required to accomplish the task should be
used. Since it would be preferable to require compliance with the Conventions
without using force, the sanctioning body should first call the breach to the
425
attention of the responsible state before any sanctions are instigated.
Only when the erring belligerent fails to take corrective action should the
sanctioning process be set in motion. Sanctions ordinarily follow a two step
process. First there is resort to non-forceful sanctions, that is diplomatic
426
measures and world opinion, and if that fails force is brought to bear. It
has been urged that world opinion is an extremely potent sanction and that its
427importance is growing in the modern world. ' Yet, world opinion has not
forced Israel to return the Arab lands, no has world opinion compelled North
Viet Nam to comply with the POW Convention. It is submitted that world
opinion is effective only when it will benefit the belligerent state's interests
to heed the call of world opinion rather than continue on its course of
conduct. When as in the case in the Arab-Israeli and Viet Nam conflicts,
world opinion and diplomatic moves are ignored, then more forceful means may
be used. These would include war and reprisals, but reprisals need not
necessarily be military. They may be economic, and if vigorously applied,
429
428
still be effective. Since an International Criminal Court has been
dismissed as being impractical, as well as unacceptable to most states,




In a situation in which a group of states are intervening with military
force to require compliance with humanitarian principles in the conduct of
war, their intervention would broaden the destruction of human values,
perhaps beyond those values already involved. The imposition of military
reprisals must be stringently controlled, or the resulting loss in human
values may be irremediable, both in respect to the state against which
sanctions are taken, and in respect to the sanctioning system which permitted
its forces to get out of control. In applying military reprisals against a
state, a world organization would be bound by the same rules as are individual
states at the present time, that is, force must not be in excess of that
431
required to accomplish the objective, must not be used against forbidden
targets, and must be capable of being halted as soon as the belligerent
z+33
complies with the rules violated. In order to meet these criteria, it
would be necessary for a single military commander to maintain firm control
over all sanctioning military forces involved. In a world which has for over
twenty-five years been attempting to comply with Articles k2 and k3 of the
^3/4
United Nations Charter providing for a peacekeeping military force, it is
unlikely that military forces could be marshalled to take action against a
state effectively sponsored by a major world pov/er. Military sanctions have
not worked when applied by individual states, and the political realities
would indicate that their use by the world community against a belligerent is
highly unlikely.
3. Economic Sanctions.
When considered from the viewpoint of the conservation of human values,
economic sanctions would seem to be preferable to armed force. It is however
evident that economic sanctions alone wi 1 1 not be effective in all circum-
stances, if for no other reason than that the United Nations has tried
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economic sanctions to enforce humani tar ion interests in the case of Southern
Rhodesia, and they were not effective. This would appear to indicate that
sanctions denying military material to a state and generally imposing strin-
gent economic barriers against that state are not an effective means of
enforcing human rights. In a very general sense this may be correct. However
Rhodesia at the time was not actively engaged in a war requiring massive
amounts of war materials to continue on an even footing with its enemy. The
POW and Civilian Conventions on the other hand, are applicable only during
hostilities. In the cases of Israel and North Viet Nam, each state requires
sophisticated arms which it does not have the resources to produce in order
to compete with the opposing belligerent. If these materials are completely
halted for a period of time, and the state cdntinues to expend materials in
combat, it will soon be unable to fight on the same basis as the opponent
which has continued to receive its supplies. The difference between Rhodesia
and the situations in which the POW and Civilian Conventions would be appli-
cable, is that Rhodesia was not in a war with a power of comparable military
potential
.
As may be gathered from the preceding paragraph, the term "economic
sanctions" as used in this article encompasses all trade, of every kind, and
as used herein means the effective isolation of the erring state. In the
contemporary world, each state or at least each bloc of states has grown
increasingly dependent upon other states for materials to operate its
industries, develop its human resources, and maintain its security forces.
Though such dependence may eventually result in considerable world wide
integration of resources and political power, its more immediate promise is
as a sanctioning process in limited cases. The use of such sanctions as a
cure-all is not suggested here, and it is recognized that their use in the
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contemporary world is quite limited as demonstrated in Rhodesia. Such
sanctions could heighten national pride in the state against which they are
taken , stimulating the will to resist, ^ and thus be counterproductive for
some period of time. However, where the intended goal of the erring state
may be lost if such sanctions are applied, it would seem that in cases in
which the violation itself is not imperative to the national interests, then
the risk of loosing the war may well outweigh the gain of continuing to
violate the provisions of the Conventions. If for instance North Viet Nam
was threatened with the loss of Russian and Communist China's support in the
event it continued to violate the PQW Convention, it would doubtless be
compelled to comply. To do otherwise would be an immediate forfiture of its
goals. If Israel were confronted with a loss of all military aid, it would
at least up until the past two or three years, have been compelled to comply
with the Civilian Convention or face military defeat by its Arab enemies.
Although the proposition has been put forth that non-force sanctions are
not of appreciable value in the world community, it is here submitted
that where powers of comparable military manpower are actively engaged in
hostilities, the pressure for modern weapons and supplies from outside its
boundaries, create tremendous pressures on each warring faction. Termination
of war supplies, especially where one party is numerically inferior, as is
Israel compared to the Arab states, is especially critical.
G. What Strategies are to be employed in Executing Sanctions.
Having concluded that public opinipn and diplomatic pressures will not
compel a nation to desist from violations of human rights in armed conflicts
when the offending state considers that its interests dictate continued
violations of the applicable standards, and having determined that military
force is an unaccptable means for the collective world community to enforce
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the POW and Civilian Conventions, it must next be determined how the remaining
sanction, i.e. economic sanctions, is to be applied. The objective of the
proposed sanctions would be total economic isolation of the offending state.
Total economic isolation cannot be affected except with the cooperation of
essentially all states. Where a powerful neutral state or group of states
could seriously consider imposing military sanctions against a third state,
only the cooperation of essentially all states can assure that economic
isolation wi 1 1 be complete. Assuming that the United Nations provides teams
of investigators for a sanctioning process, and that the International Court
of Justice acts as a decision-maker, the United Nations will be involved in
the process to such an extent that it might through the General Assembly, also
serve as a coordinating agency to advise each state of the status of the
sanctioning process. Further, the original investigating team could also
provide surveillence to determine when the offending state has ceased its
violations. Such surveillence would probably have to be from adjoining states
and depend an intelligence sources until there was actual compliance, at which
time the state against which the sanctions were directed would be expected to
invite the team to investigate from within its borders, or within the borders
of the occupied territory as appropriate.
VI. Enlistment of all Major Powers and Most Lesser Powers in the Sanctioning
Process
Despite the obligation assumed by all Signatories of the POW and Civilian
Conventions "...to respect and to ensure respect..." for the Conventions,
it will be exceedingly difficult to enlist the major powers in an international
sanctioning process for those Conventions. At the present time Communist
states will be most reluctant to put real teeth in any Conventions which might
hinder the current activities of guerrillas. Additionally the Communist state
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have proven in World V/ar II, in Korea and in Viet Nam that they have no
sincere regard for humanitarian values in regard to either their personnel,
or that of their enemies, where their state interest is concerned. The United
States, on the other hand, is reluctant to surrender any degree of sovereignty.
Both the free-world bloc and the communist bloc therefore are reluctant to
vest any real sanctioning power in an international convention, even one for
humanitarian purposes. On the other hand, the emerging states voice strong
support for "freedom movements" and may at the present have a genuine feeling
for humanitarian principles, particulari 1 y as they might apply to guerrillas.
This feeling may be expected to continue so long as guerrillas are doing what
the new states feel they should do, that is attempt to overthrow established
governments other than that of the new states. When they begin to work
against the new national governments, there may be some drastically revised
thinking in that quarter. But at the moment the efforts of both the free-world
and communist bloc to win the allegience of those states could be capitalized
on to gain their support for effective sanctions in the POW and Civilian
Conventi ons.
A. Humanitarian interests should prevail over immediate state interests.
"The most fatal defect in world constitutive process is in the
absence among many effective elites about the globe, despite the
broad promises of the United Nations Charter, of a genuine com-
mittment to the principle of minimum order, ..The deeds and practices
too often belie the words of authority." 1
*
The most effective system for enforcing human rights in armed conflicts,
would of course, be the elimination of the armed conflicts. This is much like
saying that the way to avoid the human suffering incident to violent crimes
is to eliminate violent crime. While this is a most laudable ideal, it has
no immediate practical application in cither instance. The great hopes born
at the formation of the United Nations organization, of forever eliminating
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war, has long since died amid the roar of cannon and the crack of rifle fire
as guerrilla and conventional wars have raged on nearly every part of the
planet. Having failed to prevent war, the question now arises, can the
various states really regulate the conduct of war so as to make its conse-
quences less disasterous to those directly participating in the conflict.
For humanitarian principles to be made effective, it will be necessary for the
states to collectively decide that those principles stated in the POW and
Civilian Conventions will prevail over any immediate state interests in con-
flict with those principles. Do any events tend to offer some hope that
perhaps such an attitude might be fostered?
Actually when the world situation is surveyed, all is not as dark as
might be portrayed in the Arab-Israel i and Viet Nam conflicts. Most of the
states in Europe have already surrendered a greater measure of sovereignty in
the interest of human rights than would be necessary to enforce the POW and
Civilian Conventions. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, represents a great step forward in placing human rights above
purely state interests. Although the African states have not gone this far
in their pursuit of human rights, many of the newly independent states have
written provisions respecting human rights into their constitutions. A
start toward a system similar to the European Convention on Human Rights has
been made in the Anrericas, with the American Convention on Human Rights.
With a growing tide of professed awareness of human rights, those considerations
for human values expressed in the POW and Civilian Conventions might now
receive greater emphasis to the extent that they could actually be enforced.*'
It is relevant to note that those states which have adopted the European
Convention of Human Rights were those which most severely felt the ravages of
War during the Second World War, and those which so quickly placed human rights
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considerations in their constitutions were those which were long denied those
rights. It is this last group of states in particular which look to inter-
national rules as a safeguard for equality and humane treatment. There is
thus a great number of states on record as strongly supporting humani tarian
concepts.
The real test as to whether the POW and Civilian Conventions can be
provided with effective sanctions, is whether the most powerful states can be
convinced that their interests will best be served by complying with the
Conventions. The Communist bloc strongly urges that revolution is an inter-
kkQ
national conflict and that revolutionaries or freedom fighters should be
treated as prisoners of war. Russia is deeply involved in the Middle East
with the Arab states and shares their interest in seeing the Civilian Conven-
tions applied to the Israeli occupied terrirories. Each of these desires on
the part of Communist states, combined with their desire to gain influence
with other states, provide a negotiating tool for possible use in arriving at
suitable and effective sanctions for the POW and Civilian Conventions. The
United States having experienced the present communist attitude toward
pri soners-of-war in Korea and Viet Nam with the resulting impact on the
domestic scene, especially during the Viet Nam war, should be most anxious
to avoid a repetition of that situation in any future conflict. Additionally
the United States as well as Russia must feel the need to use every means of
gaining influence with the newly emerging states and in refurbishing its
humanitarian image.
Both the free-world bloc and the communist bloc thus have levers avail-
able to win concessions from the other side. Each side might therefore be
able to get into the Conventions what they consider would best serve their
national interests. A trade-off of effective sanctions for the POW and
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Civilian Conventions, in exchange for treatment of guerrillas and terrorists
as prisoners of war might induce the two major military powers to reach an
agreement. It may be surmised from the numerous United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions on such matters as respect for human rights in armed
conflicts, and basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in
armed conflicts, all of which refer either directly to the applicable
Geneva Concentions or at least to the principles stated therein, that the
great majority of states would favorably endorse an arrangement which would
protect guerrillas that do not satisfy the current standards for legitimate
belligerents, and provide effective sanctions for the conventions as rewritten.
Israel and North Viet Nam may be expected to vigorously oppose any such
proposals. However, it must be recalled that the rules currently stated as
they apply to those two staaes, ar& accepted customary international law,
which those two states are currently, and have for some time been violating.
They would naturally oppose sanctions being tacked to those rules. Complete
unanimity is not however required for effective enforcement. In the Viet Nam
war, the United States alone was able to require South Viet Nam to comply with
the POW Convention, respecting guerrillas, despite their failure to meet all
the requirements of legitimate belligerents. The support of all the major
military and industrial powers should be at least as effective when applied
against a state which must constantly strive to assure that its neighbors do
not become militarily superior to it.
B. The Sanctions to be applied and the system for administering them
should be designated in the Conventions.
The greatest fault in international treaties concerning rules of warfare
and human rights, is the absence of predetermined sanctions to be applied
following a designated procedure, in the event of a breach of the treaty

117
provisions by a party bound by its provisions. Although the POW and Civilian
Conventions provide for municipal penal sanctions to be applied against
individuals for grave breaches of the Conventions, and the 1907 Hague
451
Convention provides for Compensation for breaches of those rules, neither
provide for any system to compel the states to comply with those sanctions.
It is this point which should be specified on the theory that if specified
punishment will surely follow all violations, then there will be no violations.
Under the present conventions, there is little chance that a state which
violates the POW and Civilian Convention will be called to answer for its
transgressions. States, therefore, can reckon their national interest solely
on the basis of what they will stand to gain by violating the Conventions,
rather than what they stand to lose by violating them, or even whether the
gains will outweigh the losses, for under the present conventions as adminis-
tered, there are no substantive losses to be considered. If specific sanctions
would automatically be applied on the occassion of a violation, then at least
the state contemplating a violation would have to weigh the possible gains
against the known losses, and if it would lose more than it would gain, would
likely be inclined to adhere to the provisions of the Convention concerned.
It is not enough that it be known that specific sanctions will be applied
when violations occur, but it must also be known that machinery is currently
available to put those sanctions in force,
1. Investigative Procedure
The United Nations has undertaken a number of fact-finding missions in
the past with varying degrees of success. It has therefore shown that a
properly constituted United Nations team can perform a valuable fact-finding
service. A fact finding team operating under the auspices of the United
Nations would therefore be preferable to one comprised of nationals from any
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particular state. Since the International Court of Justice would seem to be
the logical decision-maker regarding violations of the Conventions, that body
pursuant to Article 50 of its statute should have a team of investigators
/4C3
appointed at all times to investigate charges of violations of the Conventions.
The mere fact that there stands ready a body to take action in the event of
breaches of the Conventions should of itself deter violations. The prepara-
tion and publication of a report should further reduce violations. Where a
state accused of violation will not permit the investigative team to conduct
onsite inspections, the report would necessarily be prepared from information
otherwise available. An impartial gathering and sifting of the facts would
seem to have a deterrent effect, for violations of the POW and Civilian Con-
ventions can generally be ascertained by an impartial inspection. It is
likely for this very reason that North Viet Nam has consistently refused
inspection of the American, pri soner-of-war facilities.
2. International Court of Justice
If after an investigation has been completed there are questions to be
resolved concerning the juridical effect of the facts as ascertained by the
investigative team, the case should be brought before the International Court
of Justice. That organization is not political in character, and its members
are required to act impartially in their judicial capacity. Upon the
court's determination of the juridical significance of the facts before it,
their findings should be transmitted to each state signatory of the POW and
Civilian Convention. At the end of a predetermined period of time, a state
found guilty of violations should be permitted to show that it is no longer
in violation of the Conventions, subject to immediate inspection by the United
Nations inspection team. If the inspection discloses that the state is then
complying with the Conventions, a report would be submitted to the court and
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the court would transmit copies to the same entities which received copies of
its judgment. If the state was still in violation of the Conventions, the
court would immediately transmit an addendum to their original judgment
calling on each state to execute the sanctions provided in the Conventions.
The sanctions would continue in effect until the violations had ceased. When
the court is satisfied that the state is complying with the Conventions, the
sanctions would be immediately lifted.
3. Sanctions
Once a situation arises, states are reluctant to instigate or approve
sanctions against another state with similar interests. This tendency has
been repeatedly proven in the United Nations. For sanctions to be applied,
they must therefore be determined ahead of time and need only be executed.
This puts each state in the position of being obligated to immediately take
certain action upon the determination that a Convention is being violated.
Such specific actions then should be set forth in the POW and Civilian
Conventions.
k. Expectations of effectiveness of the foregoing proposals.
The principle that a state as a sovereign is sensitive to any action
which might tend to disparage its national pride must be taken into account
in any international sanctioning process. The foregoing proposals attempt to
utilize that characteristic of sovereign states to bolster its effectiveness,
A state has at least two opportunities to gracefully alter its practice to
comply with the conventions, even after a complaint is filed with the court.
Once the investigation has been completed and the state is made aware of the
facts, it may then act to bring its conduct within the Conventions and assert
that its former actions were based on the facts then known to it, and that in
the light of additional facts disclosed by the investigation but unknown to
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its state officials, there were technical violations of the Convention in
question, which it has corrected. While permitting a graceful exit from a
difficult situation by a state which was knowingly in violation of the
Convention, this procedure also enables a state whose leader had in fact been
kept in ignorance of the true facts to correct some problems within his own
organization, and hence the "I didn't know I was wrong" rhetoric would in fact
be true.
The second point at which a state may gracefully comply with the Conven-
tions after a complaint has been filed is when the court has determined the
juridical effect of the facts as determined. The state may then assert that
even if it disagrees with the courts decision, it will still honor its
obligations pursuant to the Convention and the decision of the court. The
investigation and the court therefore offer two escape values by which a
state may salvage its national pride and still change its course of conduct
prior to sanctions actually being put into effect. This is an important
feature, because the objective of the entire process is to secure compliance
with the Conventions without having to resort to sanctions. This feature
enhances that goal.
C. Proposed Articles to be included in the POW and Civilian Conventions.
The present POW and Civilian Conventions depend for their enforcement on
the Articles in each convention providing for municipal penal sanctions
Z456
against individual offenders, and the general undertaking that each state
will respect and ensure respect for the Conventions. When as a matter of
state policy the Conventions are violated, only the general principles of
international law permitting various diplomatic efforts and reprisals remain
to the state or states against which the violations are taking place. It is
proposed that a sanctioning process be incorporated directly into the Conventions
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so that there is no doubt as to what procedure can or will be followed in
case of a breach of the Convention by any state or other entity. The breaches
for which the sanctioning process would be activated should be only those
violations defined as "grave breaches" as specified in Article 130 of the POW
Convention, and Article 1^7 of the Civilian Convention, The acts
specified in these articles are accepted as customary international law, and
are therefore binding on every belligerent whether a signatory of the Convention
or not, and whether a state or other organization. This approach is by
no means unprecedented in international circles. The European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty which came into force in July 1952, between six European
*+62
States provided for a High Authority whose decisions would be binding, and
which could impose fines and daily penalty payments against offenders within
463
certain limits. The application of this principle to the rules of war
however has not been successfully attempted, probably because when a state is
engaged in war, it is fighting for survival, and there is little inclination
to permit even disinterested parties to determine what a state may or may not
do under those circumstances. The POW and Civilian Conventions are of very
limited application and except in cases where a state sets out with the
immediate goal of territorial acquisition as has Israel, the state interests
involved are not great. In view of the purpose of the Conventions and the
limited objectives ordinarily to be gained by violating them, the following
proposed Articles for both Conventions would seem to have some reasonable
possibility of being acceptable,
1 . Revised Article 1
Recognizing that the substantive provisions of the Convention as set
forth in (Article 130 of the POW and 1^7 of the Civilian Convention)
embody long established customary law, the High Contracting Parties
agree to comply with and to enforce those provisions against all
belligerents, whether legal or illegal, and whether state or non-
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state entities, according to the procedures and measures set out
in this Convention. Recognizing that other provisions of the
Convention whi le of an administrative nature, nevertheless are
of a humanitarian character, the High Contracting Parties under-
take to comply with and ensure compliance with those provisions
in all circumstances.
The first sentence of this revised article would bind each state to
participate in the sanctioning process against all entities which violated
those provisions accepted as customary international law. Just what offenses
are considered violations of international law is not left to the interpreta-
tion of the individual state, but is instead settled by reference to the grave
breaches article of the respective conventions. The second sentence recog-
nizes the administrative character of the greater part of the Conventions
and that failure to comply with those provisions is not comparable to the
destruction of human values that occurs when there are "grave breaches"*
This sentence further recognizes the distinction between those provisions of
the Convention which are customary law and therefore binding on all contracting
powers. Compliance with the administrative provisions is accordingly put on a
much lower scale, relying primarily on the willingness of the states to honor
their undertaking under the Convention, and the pressure of world opinion.
The urgency for the enforcement of the administrative provisions is thus
balanced against the destruction of values which could be involved if their
enforcement were to be required subject to the sanctions. Further, an
attempt to bring those detailed administrative provisions within the sanctioning
process would clog the entire process with real and imagined violations of
petty provisions, and thus decrease the time and resources available to
enforce the substantive provisions.
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2. Proposed New Article Vesting Jurisdiction to determine applicability
of and Violations of Conventions.
The High Contracting Parties agree upon their adherence to the
present Convention, to submit to the International Court of Justice
all disputes concerning whether there exists a conflict to which
the Convention is applicable, and if so whether there are existing
violations of the Convention. If the court determines that such a
conflict does exist, and that a High Contracting Party or any state
receiving military or economic assistance directly or indirectly
from a High Contracting Party, or any other entity receiving military
or economic assistance directly or indirectly from a High Contracting
Party, is in violation of the Convention, the Court will advise a
representative of such state or other entity of its findings, and of
their obligation to cease such violations, and will advise all High
Contracting Parties and United Nations Members of its findings.
If after sixty days from the time notification has been sent to the
High Contracting Parties, the state or other entity involved, such
violations have not been halted, the court will so, notify all High
Contracting Parties and all United Nations Members.
The article proposed would designate the International Court of Justice
as the decision-maker for all parties to the Convention, whether they are
directly involved in the conflict, or whether they are providing military or
economic assistance to a party to the conflict. The jurisdiction under this
article is aimed directly at the High Contracting Parties to the Convention,
and by bringing in the contracting parties even where they are not directly
involved in the conflict, may reach states which are not parties to the Con-
vention but do receive support from the contracting party. This method can
through a contracting party, also reach a guerrilla organization which could
not itself be a party before the court because it is not a state (the court's
...... . ,. . . . k6kjurisdiction is limited to states).
Because of political factors in the United Nations, which at times serve
to deny some states membership in that organization, the contracting states
submission to the jurisdiction of the court is required in the Conventi-on to
permit the court to take jurisdiction of the dispute pursuant to Article 36
of the statute of the International Court of Justice. Since the juris-
diction of the Court is based on the principle of consent by the sovereign
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states, that consent must be secured in some fashion and thus would seem
to be the only route open prior to the time a dispute actually arises. After
a dispute arises, an offender-is unlikely to submit to the jurisdiction of the
court. This technique has long been used in various types of conventions and
is by no means unique. The 1970-71 International Court of Justice yearbook
lists nearly two hundred treaties and conventions in which jurisdiction has
been granted to the court, or to a previous international court to which the
present court is a successor. Although this technique cannot be used to
reach al
1
conflicts, most notably those in which guerrilla bands receive no
support from a contracting party and are thus engaged in genuine civil wars,
and those in which a state receives no assistance from a contracting party,
the experience in the present world over the past few years has shown that
the great majority of conflicts of any consequence would come within a
catagory to be covered by this proposed Article.
The actual dispute before the court would entail a bona fide case between
two or more signatories of the Convention, regardless of whether the belli-
gerents were signatories or not. This would be accomplished by providing
in the sanctioning provi sions, that ence a High Contracting Party presented
substantial evidence to another High Contracting Party, that an entity to
which it was providing aid was violating the Convention, the second party
would be obligated to immediately investigate the matter, and if such viola-
tions did exist, and were not immediately halted, it must stop all aid. If
the second Contracting Party either determined that no violation existed, or
refused to halt its aid to the entity guilty of a violation, then there,
would be a dispute between two High Contracting Parties. In this manner,
the court could reach most conflicts in the present world order. The
remainder of the proposed Article is self-explanatory and deals with the
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mechanics of notifying states and other entities of the court's decision, and
the status of that decision.
3. Proposed Article on Investigative Procedures.
The International Court of Justice will appoint four teams each consist-
ing of seven members with five alternates upon these treaty provisions
coming into effect. When a dispute arises between High Contracting
Parties the court will attempt to designate a team whose members are
acceptable to the High Contracting States which are party to the
dispute, but if at the end of thirty days no agreement has been reached
as to all or part of the membership of the investigative team, the
Court shall designate a team without regard to whether members are
acceptable to the High Contracting States involved in the dispute. The
investigative team shall within sixty days of the date it formally
meets with a majority of its appointed members, complete its investi-
gation and submit a copy thereof to each High Contracting Party to the
dispute and to the International Court of Justice. The Investigative
team shall continue to be available to conduct such other investigations
into the particular dispute as shall be directed by the court.
The purpose of the Investigative team shall be to gather facts for the
-court, and to notify the state parties to the dispute of the facts it has
unearthed. The parties to the dispute should make every effort to mutually
agree on the composition of the investigative team, but the procedure for
designating the team should not be permitted to delay the investigation an
inordinate amount of time. Hence, the court is authorized to fill all
vacancies still existing after a reasonable amount of time. The investigators
are not interested in the juridical effect of the facts they uncover, but
only in the existence of the facts. For this reason and because the type of
conduct defined as "grave breaches" can be readily ascertained with an onsite
inspection, the investigative team is given a relatively short period in
which to complete its investigation.
The Court will need the services of the investigative team to assure there
has been compliance with the applicable Convention before the Courts decides
the case, provided the alleged offender maintains it has commenced compliance
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since the original investigation. The Court will also need the team to assure
there has been compliance after it renders its decision and before the
sanctions go into effect, as well as to investigate claims of compliance after
the sanctions are put into effect so they can be halted. The team would
therefore remain intact until the sanctioning process is completed.
k. Proposed Article setting forth Specific Sanctions.
a. Upon notification by any High Contracting Party or by any state
involved in an armed conflict, that any state or other entity engaged
in the armed conflict is violating the (POW or Civilian as appropriate),
the "grave breaches" article of the Convention, the High Contracting
State so notified and which is providing military or economic support,
or both, to the state or other entity alleged to be violating the
Convention, shall within thirty days make a determination as to whether
the allegations are true, and if they are true, shall immediately make
every effort to have the offending party desist from such violations.
If these efforts on the part of the High Contracting Party providing
such support are unsuccessful, thot High Contracting Party shall halt
all military and economic support to the offending entity, shall halt
all imports from and exports to the entity with the exception that
medical supplies may continue to be provided, and shall withdraw all
troops, and military advisors, from the entity in violation of the
Convention.
b. If the High Contracting Party providing Military or economic aid,
or both, to the entity accused of violating the grave breaches article
of the Convention, either determines that the Convention is not
being violated, or refuses to halt all military and economic aid and
withdraw all troops, military advisors and diplomatic personnel, as
provided in paragraph a above, the matter may be referred to the
International Court of~Justice by any High Contracting Party.
c. Upon a determination by the International Court of Justice that a
state or other entity is in violation of the grave breaches article of
the Convention and the failure of the state or other entity to halt
such violations, all High Contracting Parties shall immediately halt
all imports from and exports to the offending state or other entity,
except for medical supplies, shall withdraw all military and economic
aid and support, as well as all troops, and military advisors from
the state or other entity determined by the court to be in violation
of the Convention. These measures will continue in effect until the
Court notifies the High Contracting Parties that the violations of
the Convention have ceased.
d. In halting all exports to and imports from, and all military and
economic aid to a state or other entity determined to be in violation
of the Convention, all High Contracting Parties shall assure that
their imports from non-contracting states and exports to non-contracting
states are not originally from or ultimately destined for the state or
other entity held to be in violation of the Convention.
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e. When a contracting state refuses to apply the above sanctions
after the appropriate determination by the Court, all other
Contracting Parties shall immediately halt all exports to and
imports from that state.
The sanctions proposed are designed to automatically go into effect once
a violation has been determined. Paragraph a obligating a state which is
supporting a belligerent to unilaterally execute sanctions against the
belligerent in the event of a violation of the Convention, also serves as a
means to get the supporting state before the court so a determination as to
whether there is a violation can be made by that body. If the supporting
state determines that there is no violation, then there is a dispute between
the complaining Contracting state and the supporting Contracting state as
to whether there is a violation. If the supporting state refuses to investi-
gate the allegations, or to apply the sanctions where its investigation
discloses violations, then it is in violation of the Convention. The
paragraph e provides sanctions against a High Contracting State which refuses
to comply with the Sanctions article of the Convention.
VII. Application of Recommended Sanctioning Process in Contemporary Situations.
Having recommended a sanctioning process for the PQW and Civilian
Conventions, it would be interesting to see how the process would apply to
the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the American pri soners-of-war held by North
Viet Nam. This should point out defeciencies in the system, and give some
indication of factors which might inhibit its application in some circum-
stances.
A. American pri soners-of-war in North Viet Nam.
North Viet Nam procures nearly all its war materials from Russia and
Communist China. Without the support of these two states, it would be
incapable of fighting a conventional war at the level it has over the past
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several years. As a consequence of the war, North Viet Nam holds in the
neighborhood of *+00 American pr i soners-of-war . With few exceptions these
prisoners are not accorded the administrative provisions of the POW Convention
and there is substantial evidence that the substantive provisions are also
being violated. The two most likely motives for North Viet Nam's refusal
to comply with the POW Convention are the expectation that the emotional
impact of the prisoners can be used to exert domestic pressure in the United
States to withdraw support for South Viet Nam, and the hope of holding the
prisoners as hostages until the United States pays North Viet Nam for the
damages done to North Viet Nam by American bombs.
If the proposed sanctioning process was in effect when the United States
became involved on a large scale in the Viet Nam War, the United States would
have made a complaint to North Viet Nam, Russia, and Communist China, all of
which have acceded to the ,PQW Convention. Each of these states would have
made a determination as to whether there were substantive violations, and if
so, Russia and Communist China would have stopped all aid and assistance of
any type to North Viet Nam, as would all other parties to the Convention. If
Russia and Communist China maintained there were no "grave breaches", then
the matter would have been referred to the International Court of Justice for
investigation and a judgment on the merits. Assuming there was a determination
that "grave breaches" of the Convention were occuring, the real question would
be whether Russia and Communist China would carry out their treaty obligations.
It is unlikely that at the commencement of the war, North Viet Nam, Russia,
or Communist China would have reali2ed the potential value of the American
prisoners. From Russia's and Communist China's viewpoint, the option would
be to comply with the Convention or have their trade with other Contracting
Parties halted, and be confronted with adverse world opinion. Since none of
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the three Communist states could afford to have the North Vietnamese armed
forces severed from their source of supplies, it is likely that North Viet
Nam would have been forced to comply with the Convention. It is even more
likely that if the sanctions had been initially included in the Convention,
the Convention would not have been violated in the first instance.
If these sanctions were to be proposed now however, with the Viet Nam
situation in its present status, it is unlikely that either Russia, Communist
China or North Viet Nam would accede to the new provisions of the Convention,
unless a reservation was included to specifically exclude conflicts now in
progress. Assuming however that they did accede to the Convention without
that reservation, it is still likely that the pressure of world opinion
combined with the loss of international trade, would require Russia and
Communist China and therefore North Viet Nam to comply with the POW Convention,
B. Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Assuming that the proposed sanctioning process for the Civilian Conven-
tion were to go into effect in the near future, and that Israel, the United
States and all the Arab states acceded to the new sanctions without reser-
vation (it is acknowledged that this is extremely unlikely), what would be the
expected outcome for Israel's violations of the Civilian Convention. The
expulsion of civilians from occupied territory, and unlawful seizure of their
property are listed as grave breaches. There is no doubt that these
offenses have occurred following the 19^8 and 1 967 wars. The violations
occurring within the time frame they did, raise questions concerning the
nature of the offenses of expulsion of the inhabitants and the seizure of
their property, and concerning whether the sanctions would operate retro-
actively to include past offenses, or only prospectively.
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The violations listed under the grave breaches Article of the Civilian
f+70
Convention are each violations of customary international law. The fact
that these violations occurred immediately following Israel being proclaimed
a state and before the Civilian Convention was signed and ratified would
therefore be immaterial, so far as whether the actions are grave breaches.
Since the Civilian Convention was in effect long before the June 19&7 war,
there is no question as to its applicability to the territory occupied in
that conflict. The proposed sanctioning process however would have come into
being after the 19^8 and 1967 wars. This poses a problem as to when the
violations of the Civilian Conventions are complete. Is the expulsion of
civilian inhabitants of an occupied territory completed at the time they are
physically removed from the territory, or is the refusal to permit them to
return also part of the offense, making the violation a continuing offense
into the indefinite future? Is the seizure of private property completed
once the owners are deprived of it and new owners, public or private, have
assumed ownership, or is this a violation which continues so long as the
original owner is denied his property? These questions are important because
of the nature of the proposed sanctions. The sanctions are not punative in
nature. Instead they are designed solely to stop infractions which are then
occurring, not to exact punishment for past performance. This is apparent in
the provision for all sanctions to be lifted once the violations have stopped.
In this respect they are like reprisals which must cease when the violations
*+71
cease. ' Therefore, if the violations are completed before the sanctions
are applied, there is nothing to halt and the sanctions would not be put into
effect. The purpose then of sanctions is to stop violations, not to exact
punishment or right those wrongs which have already occurred. These are
matters for another forum, and regardless of how desirable it might be to use
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the available sanctions to see that justice was done for past wrongs, it is
likely that the more limited objective of merely stopping current violations
would be a more acceptable formula for prospective signatory states, and the
chances for effectiveness against an erring state would be enhanced because
the more limited objective exacts less toll from the erring state, and it
therefore need not be compelled to resist the sanctions with such determi-
nati on.
Yet, the violations committed in both the 19*+8 and 1967 conflicts co^ld
have been completed within a matter of a few months and before the sanctioning
process could have gone through all the preliminary matters required before
sanctions may be applied. If the sanctions of the Civilian Convention could
not be applied on Israel's demonstration that further violations were not
being committed because its objectives were gained, then the purpose of the
Conventions would be frustrated. It would seem that the offenses of expelling
occupants from their lands, and seizure of the land would be continuing
offenses, for a reasonable time, but not indefinitely. While it may be
difficult to articulate a precise definition as to when the violation was an
accomplished fact and no longer subject to the proposed sanctions, it would
seem that the 19^+8 violations have been completed, for the territory occupied
during that conflict has long been assimilated into Israel. On the other hand,
the terri tory .occupied in 1 967 has not been completely absorbed into Israel.
Although settlements have been made in this territory, the resettlement
has not been completed. Additionally, the vast majority of states seem to
have accepted that Israel's annexation of the territory occupied in 19*+8 is
^73
a fact, but strongly protest the occupation of the territory occupied in
1967. It would therefore seem that the violations in the territory occupied
in 19^8 have been completed and are without the sanctioning process. The
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violations in the territory occupied in 19&7 would seem to be continuing and
would come within the sanctioning process.
The foregoing analysis also answers the question whether the sanctioning
provisions would operate only prospectively. Since the 19^8 violations are
completed, they would not be applicable to those violations. Nor would they
be applicable to the 1967 violations of unnecessarily destroying homes and
other buildings, for those violations too are completed. They should,
however, be applicable to other 19&7 violations of a continuing nature,
because the violations are currently in progress.
Assuming that the sanctions recommended in this paper were to go into
effect tomorrow, how would they be applied against Israel? The procedure for
notifying various states would be the same as that in the prisoner-of-war
held by North Viet Nam situation. Since the United States is the primary
source of arms for Israel, it, as well as other states, would be required to
impose sanctions on Israel. In view of the limited objective, permitting
inhabitants of the lands occupied in 19&7 t0 return, and withdrawing the
Israeli settlers, it is likely that despite internal pressure from Jewish
groups in the United States, that the United States would comply with the
Convention.
There is however, a question whether at this time, Israel would comply
with the Convention. There is some evidence that Israel is building nuclear
weapons. ' If this is the case, Israel, militarily, could hold its Arab
neighbors at bay for a considerable period of time without outside help. But
Israel could hot long survive without world trade while remaining on a war
alert against the Arab states and guerrilla forces. This sanction then,
again because of the limited objectives, should be sufficient to force
compliance as to territory occupied in 19&7. Indeed, if Israel does now have
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Atomic weapons, the need for this occupied territory as a defensive buffer
zone would not seem to be so pressing. It is therefore suggested that the
proposed sanctioning process could most likely be used to halt and even
reverse the Israeli violations occurring in the territory that Israel
occupied in 19&7*
CONCLUSIONS
The POW and Civilian Conventions are intended to provide protection to
pri soners-of-war and civilians in occupied territory. The enforcement of
these Conventions has been left principally to the good intentions of the
captor and the occupying power. When the captor or occupying power declines,
for whatever reason, to comply with the applicable convention, the other
state must currently rely on world opinion and reprisals to halt the illegal
conduct. When the state or other organization against which the illegal
action is being taken, has no military means with which to threaten the
offending state, and the offending state's interests are move valuable to it
than is world opinion, there is no effective remedy for violations.
Whether a state will comply with the POW or Civilian Convention, depends
on whether its interests will be substantially advanced by the violation, as
compared to any losses which may be incurred as a result of the violations.
The key to a successful sanctioning process, is therefore a system which
would assure that the interests of a state would be injured more by non-
compliance, than they would be furthered by non-compliance.
The effectiveness of an international sanctioning process depends on
reserve power which can be brought to bear when international standards are
violated. This reserve power may be in the form of either military or non-
military reserves, or both.

I3*t
The warlike reserves may be constituted of either legal or illegal means
of armed force, which either are not being used, or are not being used to the
maximum extent of which the possessor is capable. Potential objects of attack,
whether legal or illegal, or both, also add to the arsenal of reserve power
available to a belligerent, provided the belligerent has the military capability
of hitting those targets. Military sanctions therefore depend for their
effectiveness on reserve forces of military power, and on the vulnerability
of enemy targets which are not, or have not previously been attacked in full
force, either because the target is not a legitimate object of attack, or
through some tacit understanding.
Non-military sanctions include all available diplomatic channels, world
opinion, and economic isolation. The effectiveness of diplomacy and world
opinion vary with the sensitivity of the offending state to these factors.
Where the offending states interests are greatly enhanced through the illegal
conduct in question, as is Israel's seizure of Arab territory, diplomatic
pressure and world opinion are likely to be ignored with the realization
that both will fade away in time. Economic isolation must be complete to be
effective, and even in the modern world in which many states are greatly
dependant on others, is not likely to be effective when the state isolated is
not engaged in a war which requires it to expend materials and supplies
substantially in excess of its productive capacity. On the other hand, when
a state is either actively engaged in warfare requiring the import of large
quantities of war materials, or is compelled by hostile neighbors to maintain
at least a posture of military equality, the threat of economic isolation is
an effective deterrent. Economic sanctions would therefore be effective in
those circumstances in which the target state is actively engaged in large
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scale war (relative to the size of the state), or is surrounded by we 1 1 armed
hostile neighboring states.
The practical and political problems involved in mustering an inter-
national military force, have been aptly demonstrated by the futile efforts of
the United Nations in this regard over the past twenty-five years. The
humanitarian nature of the POW and Civilian Conventions is such that sanctions
embodying armed force should be avoided in any event, where any other means
are reasonably available to compel enforcement of the Conventions humanitarian
provisions. Measures involving economic sanctions are likely, in an active
combat situation to be at least as effective as massive military force, with
less immediate destruction of human values. The potential of mustering
sufficient support for economic, as contrasted to military sanctions is
greater, and may well be acceptable to a sufficient number of states to be
effective.
An entity with the respect and confidence of the world community would
be required to determine when the sanctions are to be put into effect. The
unique position of the International Court of Justice, its access to investi-
gative resources, and the general attitude of states that the United Nations
should be involved in this function, all favor its being designated as a
decision maker for the proposed sanctioning provisions of the POW and Geneva
Convent ions.
The sanctioning process proposed in this article are not, however, with-
out limitation. The most obvious limitation is that they will not work in a
war between the major industrial world powers, for these states are capable
of respectively manufacturing their own war materials. On the other hand they
should work in any conflict between states other than those powers. The
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proposed sanctions also require prompt implementation in the event of
violations. Otherwise the objective of the offending belligerent will be
gained before sanctions are applied. A case in point is the territory which
Israel occupied in 19^8, and which is new generally conceded as being part
of Israel, rather than occupied territory. The sanctions must therefore be
put into effect before the offending state has consolidated its gains.
In the last analysis however, the question on which any effective
sanctions must hinge, is whether the collective world community really values
the humanitarian principles expressed in the POW and Civilian Conventions,
more than the potential national gains which may accrue through the violation
of those principles. If the answer is in the affirmative, then effective
sanctions can be made available. If the answer is in the negative, then no
proposal to enforce those provisions will be accepted or enforced. The states
will then continue to mouth pious platitudes as hob-nailed boots leave their
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